An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This article articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. Section 1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism/nonconsequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to secure in a principled way. Section 2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. Section 3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in section 1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. Section 4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (1) best explains the normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (2) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (3) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. Section 5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate.
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sylvan, K. L.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2020-01-01
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-51
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W3000564765
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 138.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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