What zombies can't do: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Could an individual act and speak just like other individuals without having any internal conscious experience? Belief in the possibility of so-called philosophical zombies serves as a litmus test for whether someone believes in some form of mind–body dualism or materialism. This chapter focuses on a related hypothesis that is emerging within psychology referred to as the psychological zombie hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that our behaviors and judgements are produced by an ‘inner-zombie’ whose mental work does not depend on conscious awareness, and that those mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness do not rely on awareness to generate the operations and their outputs. This hypothesis suggests that mental operations which are typically accompanied by conscious awareness can be produced in the absence of conscious awareness, thus demonstrating the superfluousness of awareness.
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Cites
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Background
Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lieberman, M. D.
- Venue
- In two minds: Dual processes and beyond
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-01-29
- Pages
- 293-316
- OpenAlex
- W948190280
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 22.40
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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