The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Open accessAbstract
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Although the CRT has a substantial correlation with cognitive ability, a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled. We conjecture that this is because neither intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does. We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was a stronger predictor of performance on a broad battery of heuristics-and-biases and rational-thinking tasks than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, or executive functioning. It remained a unique predictor after statistically controlling for those other individual-difference measures, suggesting it taps miserly processing as a performance measure.
Key findings
- The CRT had its highest zero-order correlation with the rational-thinking composite (*r* = .49), followed by the heuristics-and-biases composite (*r* = .42) and the cognitive ability index CA2 (*r* = .40).
- In hierarchical regression predicting the rational-thinking composite, intelligence accounted for 17.3% of variance, executive function added 5.6%, thinking dispositions added 2.1%, and the CRT added 11.2% unique variance (*p* < .001); overall *R*² = .362.
- For the heuristics-and-biases composite, the CRT again predicted the most unique variance (8.0%), with thinking dispositions next (4.0%). For syllogistic reasoning with belief bias, only intelligence and the CRT were significant unique predictors (5.1% and 6.4%, respectively).
- Commonality analysis showed CRT unique variance = .108, cognitive ability unique variance = .074, and thinking dispositions unique variance = .016, with total variance explained in the rational-thinking composite = .356. CRT performance was low: mean = 0.7 items correct (*SD* = 0.93); 55.8% solved none and 6.6% solved all three.
Methods
- A total of 346 participants (95 males, 251 females; mean age = 20.1 years, *SD* = 3.9), mostly first-year undergraduates, completed a single 2-h battery.
- Measures included the 3-item CRT; WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning plus PASAT working memory as cognitive ability indices; 15 heuristics-and-biases tasks; syllogistic reasoning with belief bias; executive-function tasks (Trailmaking, Stroop, PASAT); and thinking-disposition scales (Actively Open-Minded Thinking, superstitious thinking, Consideration of Future Consequences).
- Analyses used zero-order correlations, hierarchical regression, and commonality analysis.
Limitations
- The paper states that the executive-functioning measures may have been “too thin and heterogeneous,” with only one task per construct, and that growing publicity/familiarity with CRT items could threaten its status as a performance measure. It also reports modest reliability for the heuristics-and-biases composite (split-half = .495; Cronbach’s alpha = .484).
- Evident from the text: the sample was predominantly female, first-year undergraduates recruited at one large university, limiting generalizability; the design was correlational, so causal direction cannot be established.
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Claims the paper makes
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- Findingown data
The CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks after other measures of individual differences were statistically controlled.
“a series of regression analyses indicated that the CRT was a unique predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In this study, the CRT was a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning.
“In this study, we showed that the CRT is a more potent predictor of performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases literature than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The CRT accounted for substantial additional variance in heuristics-and-biases performance after other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled.
“It accounted for substantial additional variance after the other measures of individual differences had been statistically controlled.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In this study, cognitive ability correlated .40 with CRT performance.
“and below we report a .40correlation between cognitive ability and CRT performance.”
- Also stated in: § Results · plain
“its correlation with CA2 (.40), the cognitive ability indicator that combined the WASI composite with working memory performance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Results · plain
- Findingown data
For the heuristics-and-biases task score, each of the four blocks was statistically significant (p < .001) when entered hierarchically.
“Each of the four blocks was statistically significant (p < .001)when entered hierarchically.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data
In a hierarchical regression predicting the rational-thinking composite, WASI Vocabulary and WASI Matrix scores accounted for 17.3% of the variance (p < .001).
“The first block of variables entered were the WASI Vocabulary and WASI Matrix scores, and they accounted for 17.3% of the variance (p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the final hierarchical regression with the rational-thinking composite as criterion, the first block (WASI Vocabulary, WASI Matrix, and working memory) accounted for 22.7% of the variance (p < .001).
“The first block of variables entered were the WASI Vocabulary, WASI Matrix, and working memory scores, and they accounted for 22.7% of the variance (p < .001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The executive-functioning measures were not strong unique predictors in these analyses.
“The executive-functioning measures were not strong unique predictors in these analyses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
When overlap with thinking disposition measures is partialed out as well, the CRT remains able to predict substantial unique variance.
“Finally, when the overlap with thinking disposition measures is partialed out as well, the CRT remains able to predict substantial unique variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In that final analysis, the CRT was the more potent unique predictor of the three (10.8% unique variance vs. 7.4% and 1.6%).
“The far right column indicates that the CRT was the more potent unique predictor of the three (10.8%unique variance vs. 7.4% and 1.6%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The CRT's ability to predict performance on the heuristics-and-biases task score was not due to variance shared with cognitive ability, executive functioning, or thinking dispositions.
“The CRT's ability to predict performance on this variable was again not due to variance shared with cognitive ability, executive functioning, or thinking dispositions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There is considerable variation in task difficulty among the heuristics-and-biases tasks.
“There is considerable variation in task difficulty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In that final analysis, scores on the CRT accounted for a substantial amount of unique variance (10.8%, p < .001).
“Finally, scores on the CRT were entered into the equation and accounted for a substantial amount of unique variance (10.8%, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The three thinking disposition measures accounted for an additional 2.1% of the variance (p < .05) in the rational-thinking composite after cognitive ability and executive functioning.
“Entered third as a block were the three thinking disposition measures, and they accounted for an additional 2.1% of the variance (p < .05).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
CRT scores accounted for a substantial amount of unique variance (11.2%, p < .001) in the rational-thinking composite after cognitive ability, executive functioning, and thinking dispositions were controlled.
“Finally, scores on the CRT were entered into the equation and accounted for a substantial amount of unique variance (11.2%, p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The three executive-functioning measures accounted for an additional 5.6% of the variance (p < .001) in the rational-thinking composite after cognitive ability.
“The second block of variables entered were the three executive-functioning measures, and they accounted for an additional 5.6% of the variance (p < .001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The CRT accounts for over twice as much unique variance (11.2% vs. 4.2%) as the next best predictor (the intelligence block) in predicting the rational-thinking composite.
“There we see that the CRT accounts for over twice as much unique variance (11.2% vs. 4.2%) as the next best predictor (the intelligence block).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The zero-order correlations in Table 2 indicate that a cognitive ability measure (CA2) including working memory correlates more highly with rational-thinking performance than does the WASI alone.
“Indeed, the zeroorder correlations in Table 2 indicate that a cognitive ability measure (CA2) including working memory correlates more highly with rational-thinking performance than does the WASI alone.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
None of the 13 remaining heuristics-and-biases tasks was answered correctly by more than 75% of participants.
“None of the 13 remaining tasks was answered correctly by more than 75% of the participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The two components of rational thinking-avoidance of thinking biases on the heuristics-and-biases tasks and syllogistic reasoning independent of prior belief-correlated .29 with each other.
“The two components of rational thinkingavoidance of thinking biases on the heuristic-and-biases tasks and syllogistic reasoning independent of prior beliefdisplayed a moderate correlation with each other (.29).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In that final analysis, the second block (three thinking disposition measures) accounted for an additional 2.1% of the variance (p < .05).
“The second block of variables entered were the three thinking disposition measures, and they accounted for an additional 2.1% of the variance (p < .05).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Several regression analyses indicated that the CRT could predict rational-thinking performance independent not only of intelligence, but also of executive functioning and thinking dispositions.
“Several of the regression analyses reported indicated that this was not the case-that the CRT could predict rationalthinking performance independent not only of intelligence, but also of executive functioning and thinking dispositions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the commonality analysis, the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite common to the cognitive ability block and the thinking dispositions block was 2.8%.
“The fourth row displays the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite that is common to the cognitive ability block and the thinking dispositions block (2.8%).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the commonality analysis, the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite common to the CRT and the cognitive ability block was 10.2%.
“The next row displays the explained variance in the rationalthinking composite that is common to the CRT and the cognitive ability block (10.2%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The paper has shown that the CRT can explain a substantial amount of the reliable variance in rational thinking independent of intelligence.
“We have shown here that the CRT can explain a substantial amount of this reliable variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
- Findingown data
In the commonality analysis, the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite common to the CRT and the thinking dispositions block was 0.5%.
“The third row displays the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite that is common to the CRT and the thinking dispositions block (0.5%).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The CRT's .49 correlation with the rational-thinking composite variable was the highest correlation of any predictor.
“Its .49correlation with the rational-thinking composite variable was the highest correlation of any predictor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The CRT consistently predicted more variance in criterion variables than did the executive-functioning measures.
“The CRT also consistently predicted more variance in criterion variables than did the executive-functioning measures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
As operationalized in this study, the CRT explains substantial variance in rational thinking that cannot be accounted for by the study's measures of cognitive ability, executive functioning, or thinking dispositions.
“Nonetheless, as operationalized in this study, we found that the CRT explains substantial variance in rational thinking that cannot be accounted for by our measures of cognitive ability, executive functioning, or thinking dispositions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
- Findingown data
In all of the analyses in Table 3, the CRT accounted for more unique variance explained than did the block of intelligence measures.
“In fact, in all of the analyses in Table 3, the CRT accounted for more unique variance explained than did the block of intelligence measures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the commonality analysis, the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite common to all three predictors was 2.3%.
“The fifth row indicates that the explained variance in the rational-thinking composite that is common to all three predictors is 2.3%.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The unique variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by the Cognitive Reflection Test was .108.
“| Unique Variance | .108 | .074 | .016 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The common variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by both the Cognitive Reflection Test and thinking dispositions was .005.
“| Common 1 & 3 | .005 | | .005 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and the Heuristic-and-Biases Composite was .42.
“| 2. Heuristic-and-Biases Composite | .42 | - | | | | | | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The common variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by the Cognitive Reflection Test, cognitive ability, and thinking dispositions together was .023.
“| Common 1 & 2 & 3 | .023 | .023 | .023 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and the Rational-Thinking Composite was .49.
“| 4. Rational-Thinking Composite | .49 | (.80) | (.80) | - | | | | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The unique variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by thinking dispositions (AOT; Super; CFC) was .016.
“| Unique Variance | .108 | .074 | .016 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The common variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions was .028.
“| Common 2 & 3 | | .028 | .028 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The common variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by both the Cognitive Reflection Test and cognitive ability was .102.
“| Common 1 & 2 | .102 | .102 | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The unique variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by cognitive ability (Vocab; Matrix; WM) was .074.
“| Unique Variance | .108 | .074 | .016 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Belief Bias Syllogistic Reasoning was .36.
“| 3. Belief Bias Syllogistic Reasoning | .36 | .29 | - | | | | | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The total unique plus common variance in rational-thinking composite scores explained by the three blocks was .237.
“| Total Unique + Common Variance | .237 | . | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
“We argue that the CRT is a particularly potent measure of the tendency toward miserly processing because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Koehler and James (2010) found significant correlations between the CRT and the use of and endorsement of maximizing strategies on probabilistic prediction tasks.
“Finally, Koehler and James (2010) found significant correlations between the CRT and the use of and endorsement of maximizing strategies on probabilistic prediction tasks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Koehler and James (2010) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Cokely and Kelley (2009) found a correlation of .27 between performance on the CRT and the proportion of choices consistent with expected value.
“Likewise, Cokely and Kelley (2009) found a correlation of .27 between performance on the CRT and the proportion of choices consistent with expected value.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cokely & Kelley, 2009 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Many people behave like cognitive misers: they give the first response that comes to mind without thinking further.
“They behave like cognitive misers (Dawes, 1976;Simon, 1955Simon, , 1956;;Stanovich, 2009b;Taylor, 1981;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).They give the first response that comes to mind-10 cents-without thinking further and realizing that this cannot be right.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Campitelli and Labollita (2010) found little relation between CRT performance and the choice of high-expected-value gambles.
“In contrast, Campitelli and Labollita (2010) found little relation between CRT performance and the choice of high-expected-value gambles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Campitelli & Labollita, 2010 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
The CRT has moderate overlap with measures of cognitive ability.
“The CRT clearly has moderate overlap with measures of cognitive ability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Previous research has indicated some degree of common variance among heuristics-and-biases tasks.
“Nevertheless, previous research has indicated some degree of common variance among them (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007;Finucane & Gullion, 2010;Klaczynski, 2001;Parker & Fischhoff, 2005;Slugoski, Shields, & Dawson, 1993;Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2000;West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
The rational-thinking tendencies measured by the heuristics-and-biases tasks are probably multifarious.
“The rational-thinking tendencies measured by these heuristics-and-biases tasks are probably multifarious (Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003;Stanovich, 2009bStanovich, , 2011;;Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Stanovich, 2009b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) observed a correlation of .45 between performance on the CRT and SAT quantitative scores.
“Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) observed a correlation of .45 between performance on the CRT and SAT quantitative scores”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
These results converge with a body of other work indicating that susceptibility to these biases varies considerably.
“These results converge with a body of other work indicating that the susceptibility to these biases varies considerably (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;Cokely & Kelley, 2009;Del Missier, Mantyla, & Bruine de Bruine, 2010;Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Marklein, & Sunde, 2009;Klaczynski, 2001;Oechssler et al., 2009;Stanovich & West, 1998a, 1998c, 1999, 2000, 2008b;West et al., 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Working memory tasks can be as strongly associated with cognitive ability as they are with other executive-functioning measures.
“However, Friedman et al. (2006) have shown that working memory tasks can be as strongly associated with cognitive ability as they are with other executive-functioning measures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Friedman et al. (2006) source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
There is reliable variance in rational thinking independent of intelligence.
“That there is reliable variance in rational thinking independent of intelligence has been suggested before (Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2008b;West et al., 2008), but the properties of this intelligence-partialed variance are largely unexplored.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Stanovich & West, 1998c, 2008b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites West et al., 2008 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Recent work on individual differences in cognitive function has begun to challenge the assumption that intelligence tests encompass most of what is important cognitively.
“Recent work on individual differences in cognitive function has begun to challenge this assumption (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;Oechssler et al., 2009;Stanovich, 2009bStanovich, , 2011;;Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationown data
The CRT measures properties relevant to rational thinking that go beyond those measured on intelligence tests.
“The CRT measures properties relevant to rational thinking that go beyond those measured on intelligence tests.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The CRT is a measure of the tendency toward the class of reasoning error that derives from miserly processing.
“In short, the CRT is a measure of the tendency toward the class of reasoning error that derives from miserly processing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
- Interpretationreasoning
The potency of the CRT as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks does not derive from its ability to assess knowledge gaps.
“The potency of the CRT as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks certainly does not derive from its ability to assess knowledge gaps, because it clearly does no such thing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Interpreted in this way, the CRT becomes in part a measure of rational thought, rather than a distal predictor or an underlying ability supporting rational thought.
“Interpreted in this way, the CRT becomes in part a measure of rational thought, rather than a distal predictor or an underlying ability supporting rational thought.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
- Interpretationreasoning
The CRT might be a particularly potent measure of miserly tendencies because it is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
“In fact, the CRT might be a particularly potent measure of miserly tendencies because of its logic of construction: It is a performance measure 1 rather than a self-report measure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The CRT items were unfamiliar to the participants, so the CRT remains a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
- Interpretationreasoning
The predictive power of the CRT is in part separable from cognitive ability.
“This may be why the predictive power of the CRT is in part separable from cognitive ability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Intelligence tests do not assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does.
“Intelligence tests do not assess the tendency toward miserly processing in the way that the CRT does.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 24
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 40
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataOf the 105 possible correlations among the heuristics-and-biases tasks, 86 were in the positive direction, but only 39 were significantly so.
“Of the 105 possible correlations among the heuristics-and-biases tasks, 86 were in the positive direction, but only 39 significantly so.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CRT's ability to predict performance on rational-thinking tasks is not entirely due to its variance in common with cognitive ability nor due to its variance in common with executive functioning in addition to cognitive ability.
“The results of this analysis clearly indicate that the CRT's ability to predict performance on rational-thinking tasks is not entirely due to its variance in common with cognitive abilitynor is it due to its variance in common with executive functioning in addition to cognitive ability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the analyses completed so far, the CRT was a very potent predictor and intelligence a moderate predictor.
“In the analyses completed so far, the CRT was a very potent predictor and intelligence a moderate predictor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe most difficult heuristics-and-biases task was the sample-size squash problem, answered correctly by only 15.6% of participants, and the easiest was the second gambler's fallacy problem, answered correctly by 92.2%.
“The most difficult task was the sample-size squash problem, answered correctly by only 15.6% of the participants, and the easiest task was the second gambler's fallacy problem, which was answered correctly by 92.2% of the participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CRT was the strongest correlate of the heuristics-and-biases tasks (r = .42) and was tied with CA2 (r = .36) as the most potent predictor of syllogistic reasoning with belief bias.
“The CRT was the strongest correlate of the former (r = .42)and was tied with CA2 (r = .36)as the most potent predictor of the latter.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the syllogistic reasoning analysis, the CRT predicted the most unique variance, but the intelligence block predicted almost as much unique variance.
“The CRT was once again the variable that predicted the most unique variance, but in this analysis the intelligence block predicted almost as much unique variance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataMost measures were more correlated with performance on the heuristics-and-biases tasks than with performance on syllogistic reasoning with belief bias; this was particularly true of the thinking dispositions measures (.16 to .24 versus .04 to .15).
“Most measures were more correlated with performance on the heuristics-and-biases tasks than with performance on syllogistic reasoning with belief bias.This was particularly true of the thinking dispositions measures (.16 to .24versus .04 to .15).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CRT displayed its highest correlation with the rational-thinking composite score (.49), followed by its correlation with the heuristics-and-biases composite (.42) and its correlation with CA2 (.40).
“The CRT displayed its highest correlation with this composite score (.49), followed by its correlation with the heuristics-and-biases composite (.42) and its correlation with CA2 (.40), the cognitive ability indicator that combined the WASI composite with working memory performance.”
- Also stated in: § Results · boosted
“In terms of zero-order correlations, it is clear from Table 2 that the strongest correlate of performance on the rational-thinking composite score was, in fact, the CRT (r = .49).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § Results · boosted
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn predicting the heuristics-and-biases task score, the CRT predicted the most unique variance (8.0%), and the thinking dispositions block was the next most potent unique predictor (4.0%).
“The CRT was once again the variable that predicted the most unique variance (8.0%), but in this analysis, the thinking dispositions block was the next most potent unique predictor (4.0%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CRT is moderately associated with both cognitive ability and rational-thinking skill.
“The CRT is moderately associated with both cognitive ability and rational-thinking skill.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Framing Problem task was 62.7%.
“| 11. Framing Problem | 62.7 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and WASI Matrix Reasoning was .32.
“| 7. WASI Matrix Reasoning | .32 | .24 | .21 | .28 | (.76) | .16 | - | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Superstitious Thinking was .04.
“| 13. Superstitious Thinking | .04 | .24 | .04 | .18 | .12 | .22 | .04 | .15 | .08 | .10 | .14 | .38 | - |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Gambler's Fallacy 2 task was 92.2%.
“| 6. Gambler's Fallacy 2 | 92.2 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Regression to the Mean task was 40.2%.
“| 4. Regression to the Mean | 40.2 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Covariation Detection task was 36.1%.
“| 8. Covariation Detection | 36.1 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Inhibition was .15.
“| 10. Inhibition | .15 | .17 | .16 | .21 | .24 | .18 | .19 | .35 | .32 | - | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and CA2 (WASI Comp+ WM) was .40.
“| 8. CA2 (WASI Comp+ WM) | .40 | .39 | .36 | .47 | (.81) | (.66) | (.71) | - | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Actively Open-Minded Thinking was .10.
“| 12. Actively Open-Minded Thinking | .10 | .18 | .12 | .19 | .21 | .25 | .07 | .17 | .07 | .09 | .02 | - | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and the WASI Composite was .32.
“| 5. WASI Composite | .32 | .32 | .35 | .41 | - | | | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Working Memory was .33.
“| 11. Working Memory | .33 | .33 | .22 | .34 | .30 | .17 | .29 | (.80) | .41 | .36 | - | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Sample Size: Squash Problem task was 15.6%.
“| 3. Sample Size: Squash Problem | 15.6 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Sunk Cost task was 64.2%.
“| 14. Sunk Cost | 64.2 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Causal Base Rate task was 53.8%.
“| 1. Causal Base Rate | 53.8 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Methodological Reasoning task was 27.2%.
“| 9. Methodological Reasoning | 27.2 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and Set Shifting was .28.
“| 9. Set Shifting | .28 | .15 | .12 | .17 | .27 | .11 | .30 | .40 | - | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and WASI Vocabulary was .17.
“| 6. WASI Vocabulary | .17 | .24 | .32 | .35 | (.76) | - | | | | | | | |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Probability Matching task was 23.5%.
“| 13. Probability Matching | 23.5 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Gambler's Fallacy 1 task was 69.4%.
“| 5. Gambler's Fallacy 1 | 69.4 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Sample Size: Hospital Problem task was 28.6%.
“| 2. Sample Size: Hospital Problem | 28.6 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Probabilistic Reasoning: Denominator Neglect task was 61.8%.
“| 12. Probabilistic Reasoning: Denominator Neglect | 61.8 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Outcome Bias task was 72.0%.
“| 15. Outcome Bias | 72.0 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe correlation between the Cognitive Reflection Test and CFC was .10.
“| 14. CFC | .10 | .16 | .15 | .19 | .26 | .23 | .16 | .21 | .06 | .04 | .03 | .21 | .12 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Conjunction Problem task was 19.1%.
“| 7. Conjunction Problem | 19.1 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe percentage of correct responses on the Bayesian Reasoning task was 22.3%.
“| 10. Bayesian Reasoning | 22.3 |”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response.
“The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“The task is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frederick, 2005 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationClassic insight problems do not usually trigger an attractive alternative response, whereas the three CRT problems trigger a strong alternative response that must be overridden.
“Classic insight problems (see Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009;Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005) do not usually trigger an attractive alternative response.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · boosted
“The three problems on the CRT are of interest to researchers working in the heuristics-and-biases tradition because a strong alternative response is initially primed and then must be overridden.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- Also stated in: § Abstract · boosted
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) found the CRT to be related to the number of expected-value choices and the tendency to commit the conjunction fallacy.
“Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) found the CRT to be related to the number of expected-value choices and the tendency to commit the conjunction fallacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAll tests of intelligence or cognitive aptitude are optimal performance assessments, whereas measures of thinking dispositions are often assessed under typical performance conditions.
“All tests of intelligence or cognitive aptitude are optimal performance assessments, whereas measures of thinking dispositions are often assessed under typical performance conditions (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997;Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996;Norris & Ennis, 1989;Perkins, 1995;Sternberg, 2003;Zeidner & Matthews, 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationObrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) found no relation between CRT performance and the degree of encounter frequency bias.
“In contrast, Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) found no relation between CRT performance and the degree of encounter frequency bias.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman (2009) source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrederick (2005) observed that the CRT could predict performance on measures of temporal discounting, the tendency to choose high-expected-value gambles, and framing effects.
“Frederick (2005) observed that with as few as three items, his CRT could predict performance on measures of temporal discounting, the tendency to choose high-expected-value gambles, and framing effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frederick, 2005 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrederick (2005) found that large numbers of highly select university students at MIT, Princeton, and Harvard were cognitive misers; they responded that the cost was 10 cents rather than the correct answer of 5 cents.
“Frederick (2005) found that large numbers of highly select university students at MIT, Princeton, and Harvard were cognitive misers; they responded that the cost was 10 cents, rather than the correct answer... 5 cents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frederick, 2005 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale is a 12-item scale developed by Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Scott Edwards (1994) to measure the extent to which individuals consider distant outcomes when choosing their present behavior.
“The Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale is a 12-item scale that was developed by Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Scott Edwards (1994) to measure the extent to which individuals consider distant outcomes when choosing their present behavior.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Scott Edwards (1994) source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningAnswering the problems on the CRT requires suppressing a prepotent natural response, which could be related to set-shifting and inhibitory processes assessed on measures of executive functioning.
“As the bat/ball example described above illustrates, answering the problems on the CRT requires suppressing a prepotent”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kahneman, 2003 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe PASAT is a serial-addition task used to assess working memory, divided attention, and information-processing speed.
“It is a serial-addition task used to assess working memory, divided attention, and informationprocessing speed (Gonzalez et al., 2006;Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Gonzalez et al., 2006 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe heuristics-and-biases composite score had modest reliability: split-half reliability was .495 and Cronbach's alpha was .484.
“Thus, only modest reliability for the composite score was expected, and this was the case.The split-half reliability was .495,and Cronbach's alpha was .484.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe Actively Openminded Thinking scale had a split-half reliability of .78 and Cronbach's alpha of .81.
“The split-half reliability of the scale (Spearman-Brown corrected) was .78,and Cronbach's alpha was .81.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationSuperstitious thinking has been found to predict probabilistic reasoning.
“Superstitious thinking has been found to predict probabilistic reasoning (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002;Toplak, Liu, Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrederick (2005) reported a correlation of .44 between CRT performance and SAT total scores, and a .43 correlation between CRT scores and performance on the Wonderlic IQ test.
“Frederick (2005) reported a correlation of .44 between CRT performance and SAT total scores, as well as a .43correlation between CRT scores and performance on the Wonderlic IQ test.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frederick, 2005 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe superstitious thinking scale had a split-half reliability of .83 and Cronbach's alpha of .81.
“The splithalf reliability of the scale (Spearman-Brown corrected) was .83,and Cronbach's alpha was .81.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataVariance in CRT performance overlaps with both intelligence and rational-thinking ability.
“The correlations displayed in Table 2 indicate that variance in CRT performance overlaps with both intelligence and rational-thinking ability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe CFC scale had a split-half reliability of .53 and Cronbach's alpha of .55.
“The splithalf reliability of the scale (Spearman-Brown corrected) was .53,and Cronbach's alpha was .55.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationHumans tend to be cognitive misers.
“The processing problem is the one mentioned in our introductory discussion: that humans tend to be cognitive misers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe CRT is highly relevant to the idea of humans as cognitive misers.
“In contrast, the CRT does seem highly relevant to the idea of humans as cognitive misers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
PremisereasoningMany effects in the heuristics-and-biases literature are the results of the human tendency to default to miserly processing: anchoring biases, framing effects, preference reversals, nondisjunctive reasoning, myside biases, and status quo biases.
“Many effects in the heuristicsand-biases literature are the results of the human tendency to default to miserly processing: anchoring biases, framing effects, preference reversals, nondisjunctive reasoning, myside biases, and status quo biases, to name just a few.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIntelligence and other cognitive ability tests leave out important domains of human cognition.
“It has only recently been fully recognized that intelligence and other cognitive ability tests leave out important domains of human cognition (Stanovich, 2009b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stanovich, 2009b
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe CRT measures miserliness in action and is a direct measure of miserly processing rather than an indirect self-report indicator.
“The CRT measures miserliness in action, so to speak.It is a direct measure of miserly processing rather than an indirect self-report indicator.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The CRT items were unfamiliar to the participants, so the CRT remains a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
- Rests on an assumption: Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
The paper relies on this without support.
The CRT items were unfamiliar to the participants, so the CRT remains a performance measure rather than a self-report measure.
“Clearly, if individuals become familiar with the items, the CRT can no longer be considered a performance measure.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that can be termed rational thought.
“Heuristics-and-biases tasks collectively measure a construct that we might term rational thought.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Research has shown that populist attitudes, analytical thinking, numerical thinking, bullshit receptivity, conspiracy mentality, news checking frequency, and social media use are associated with susceptibility to misinformation.
“we also included the following measures as covariates, which research has shown are associated with susceptibility to misinformation:”
From Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media (2022) · cites this paper as [50]
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Self-citationSloman, S. A. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.024 · Cited by 407 · see citing works
Thinking Twice: Two minds in one brain
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 406 · see citing works
Frisch, D. (1993) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1993.1017 · Cited by 405 · see citing works
Constructive thinking: A broad coping variable with specific components.
Epstein, S. J., & Meier, P. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.57.2.332 · Cited by 399 · see citing works
Motivation, Emotion, and Cognition
(2004) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781410610515 · Cited by 396 · see citing works
In two minds: Dual processes and beyond.
Evans, J., & Frankish, K. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.001.0001 · Cited by 395 · see citing works
Stanovich, K. E. (2004) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226771199.001.0001 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
Self-citationOutsmarting IQ: the emerging science of learnable intelligence
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2424 · Cited by 375 · see citing works
Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2007) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780600780796 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
Self-citationEmerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research
Schneider, S. L., & Shanteau, J. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609978 · Cited by 348 · see citing works
Lehman, D. R., Lempert, R. O., & Nisbett, R. E. (1988) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.43.6.431 · Cited by 341 · see citing works
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. J. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.63.4.534 · Cited by 334 · see citing works
Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135213 · Cited by 317 · see citing works
The Robot's Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin
Stanovich, K. E. (2004) · Cited by 316 · see citing works
Self-citationSá, W. C., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (1999) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-0663.91.3.497 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Oxford Handbook of Rationality
Rawling, P., & Mele, A. R. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001 · Cited by 306 · see citing works
Relations between measures of typical and maximum job performance.
Sackett, P. R., Zedeck, S., & Fogli, L. (1988) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.73.3.482 · Cited by 305 · see citing works
Constructive thinking: A broad coping variable with specific components.
Epstein, S. J., & Meier, P. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.332 · Cited by 292 · see citing works
Kokis, J. V., Macpherson, R., Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2002) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0022-0965(02)00121-2 · Cited by 274 · see citing works
Self-citationEpistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0195162293.001.0001 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
Cognitive Ability and Variation in Selection Task Performance
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/135467898394139 · Cited by 249 · see citing works
Self-citationKirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. J. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.534 · Cited by 235 · see citing works
Analytic and Heuristic Processing Influences on Adolescent Reasoning and Decision-Making
Klaczynski, P. A. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00319 · Cited by 230 · see citing works
Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/135467898394094 · Cited by 229 · see citing works
Self-citationGreater Attention Problems During Childhood Predict Poorer Executive Functioning in Late Adolescence
Friedman, N. P., Haberstick, B. C., Willcutt, E. G., Miyake, A., Young, S. E., Corley, R. P., & Hewitt, J. K. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01997.x · Cited by 229 · see citing works
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0700 · Cited by 217 · see citing works
Self-citationThinking and deciding, 4th ed.
Baron, J. (2008) · Cited by 208 · see citing works
Developing a tool for measuring the decision-making competence of older adults.
Finucane, M. L., & Gullion, C. M. (2010) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/a0019106 · Cited by 202 · see citing works
Differentiating insight from non-insight problems
Gilhooly, K., & Murphy, P. (2005) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780442000187 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
A psychological point of view: Violations of rational rules as a diagnostic of mental processes
Kahneman, D. J. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00403432 · Cited by 192 · see citing works
Stanovich, K. E. (1989) · The Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1080/00223980.1989.10542958 · Cited by 188 · see citing works
Self-citationMemory, Development, and Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Judgment and Decision Making
Reyna, V. F., Lloyd, F. J., & Brainerd, C. J. (2003) · Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609978.009 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Heuristics and biases the psychology of intuitive judgment
Gilovich, T. D., & Kahneman, D. 1.-2. (2002) · Cited by 177 · see citing works
: Working memory, inhibitory control and the development of children's reasoning
Handley, S. J., Capon, A. J., Beveridge, M. C., Dennis, I., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (2004) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780442000051 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Goal neglect and Spearman's g: Competing parts of a complex task.
Duncan, J., Parr, A., Woolgar, A., Thompson, R., Bright, P., Cox, S. G., Bishop, S. J., & Nimmo‐Smith, I. (2008) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.137.1.131 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices
Campitelli, G., & Labollita, M. (2010) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500001066 · Cited by 166 · see citing works
The endorsement of the premises: Assumption‐based or belief‐based reasoning
George, C. (1995) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1995.tb02548.x · Cited by 157 · see citing works
Executive functions in decision making: An individual differences approach
Del Missier, F., Mäntylä, T., & Bruine de Bruin, W. (2010) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546781003630117 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
On the failure of cognitive ability to predict myside and one-sided thinking biases
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780701679764 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
Self-citationDiagnosticity and pseudodiagnosticity.
Marom, T., & Fischhoff, B. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.6.1185 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Gilhooly, K. J., & Fioratou, E. (2009) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780903178615 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Is probability matching smart? Associations between probabilistic choices and cognitive ability
West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2003) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03194383 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Development of Rational Thought: A Taxonomy of Heuristics and Biases
Stanovich, K. E., Toplak, M. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Advances in child development and behavior · doi:10.1016/s0065-2407(08)00006-2 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Self-citationProgress in Executive-Function Research
Aron, A. R. (2008) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00561.x · Cited by 123 · see citing works
Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions
Reyna, V. F. (1991) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/0273-2297(91)90017-i · Cited by 116 · see citing works
The reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: a dual‐process taxonomy
Toplak, M. E., Liu, E., Macpherson, R., Toneatto, T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2007) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.544 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Self-citationDohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Marklein, F., & Sunde, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.014 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Probability matching and strategy availability
J. Koehler, D., & James, G. (2010) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/mc.38.6.667 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Dave, U. (1995) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1057/jors.1995.212 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Emotional intelligence: Science & myth
Gredler, G. R. (2004) · Psychology in the Schools · doi:10.1002/pits.20032 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Self-citationWho uses base rates andP(D/∼H)? An analysis of individual differences
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03211379 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
Self-citationUnderstanding Repeated Simple Choices
Gal, I. (1996) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/135467896394573 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
An encounter frequency account of how experience affects likelihood estimation
Obrecht, N. A., Chapman, G. B., & Gelman, R. (2009) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/mc.37.5.632 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
In two minds dual processes and beyond
Evans, J. S. B. T. 1. (2009) · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Samuels, R., & Stich, S. P. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0015 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Lieberman, M. D. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230167.003.0013 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Ackerman, P. L., & Kanfer, R. (2004) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781410610515-13 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
(Over and) beyond high-stakes testing.
Duckworth, A. L. (2009) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/a0014923 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
On the failure of intelligence to predict myside bias and one-sided bias
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Self-citationRelation of Conditional Reasoning to Heuristic Processing
Slugoski, B. R., Shields, H. A., & Dawson, K. A. (1993) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167293192004 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Higher-order preferences and the Master Rationality Motive
Stanovich, K. E. (2008) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780701384621 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Self-citationGonzalez, R., Grant, I., Miller, S. W., Taylor, M. J., Schweinsburg, B. C., Carey, C. L., Woods, S. P., Norman, M. A., Rippeth, J. D., Martin, E. M., et al. (2006) · The Clinical Neuropsychologist · doi:10.1080/13854040590967559 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
15. Rationality and Psychology
Samuels, R. J., & Stich, S. G. W. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199752393.003.0015 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Ackerman, P. L. (1994). Intelligence, attention, and learning: Maximal and typical performance. In D. K. Detterman (Ed.), Current topics in human intelligence (Vol. 4, pp. 1–27). Norwood: Ablex.
Cited by
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Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271 · see citing works
Self-citationPennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797620939054 · Cited by 1,715 · see citing works
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007 · Cited by 1,360 · see citing works
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
KAHAN, D. M., PETERS, E., DAWSON, E. C., & SLOVIC, P. (2017) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2 · Cited by 883 · see citing works
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12476 · Cited by 879 · see citing works
Online panels in social science research: Expanding sampling methods beyond Mechanical Turk
Chandler, J., Rosenzweig, C., Moss, A. J., Robinson, J., & Litman, L. (2019) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-019-01273-7 · Cited by 668 · see citing works
On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
Pennycook, G., Allan Cheyne, J., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500006999 · Cited by 536 · see citing works
Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003 · Cited by 544 · see citing works
Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media
Roozenbeek, J., van der Linden, S., Goldberg, B., Rathje, S., & Lewandowsky, S. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo6254 · Cited by 472 · see citing works
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/uhbk9 · Cited by 390 · see citing works
Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study
Kahan, D. M. (2012) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2182588 · Cited by 331 · see citing works
The brain in your pocket: Evidence that Smartphones are used to supplant thinking
Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J. A., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029 · Cited by 327 · see citing works
Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware
Stanovich, K. E. (2018) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314 · Cited by 279 · see citing works
Self-citationPennycook, G., Ross, R. M., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153039 · Cited by 232 · see citing works
Hagendorff, T., Fabi, S., & Kosinski, M. (2023) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-023-00527-x · Cited by 243 · see citing works
Links between intellectual humility and acquiring knowledge
Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J., Haggard, M. C., LaBouff, J. P., & Rowatt, W. C. (2020) · The Journal of Positive Psychology · doi:10.1080/17439760.2019.1579359 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0034910 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Self-citationThe role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Haggard, M., Rowatt, W. C., Leman, J. C., Meagher, B., Moore, C., Fergus, T., Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2018) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.12.014 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
Self-citationBayesian or biased? Analytic thinking and political belief updating
Tappin, B. M., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104375 · Cited by 127 · see citing works
Rethinking the link between cognitive sophistication and politically motivated reasoning.
Tappin, B. M., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000974 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
Reasoned connections: a dual-process perspective on creative thought
Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J. A., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2014.895915 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence?
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2020) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721420901592 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
Byrd, N., & Conway, P. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
What Makes Everyday Scientific Reasoning So Challenging?
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Individual differences in intelligence and personality guide human social learning
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Performance and Metacognition Disconnect when Reasoning in Human-AI Interaction
Fernandes, D., Villa, S., Nicholls, S., Haavisto, O., Buschek, D., Schmidt, A., Kosch, T., Shen, C., & Welsch, R. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.16708 · Cited by 71
- Authors
- Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E.
- Affiliations
- York University (CA)
- James Madison University (US)
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Toplak, Maggie E.
- Venue
- Memory & Cognition
- Published
- 2011-05-04
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1275-1289
- ISSN
- 0090-502X (ISSN-L)
- 1532-5946
- OpenAlex
- W2081056419
- Semantic Scholar
- 08d70bb4d91179f6660a4d9fceeb1fc2e9fb39db
- Cited by
- 1,047
- References
- 135
- Citations by year
- 2026: 44 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 76 · 2023: 84 · 2022: 89 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 97 · 2019: 88 · 2018: 68 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 78 · 2015: 77 · 2014: 43 · 2013: 33 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 17.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Memory & Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Canada Research Chairs
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Abilities and Testing
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Keywords
- Cognitive Reflection Test, heuristics and biases, cognitive reflection, cognitive ability, executive function, thinking dispositions, individual differences, performance prediction
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Female, Humans, Intelligence, Male, Neuropsychological Tests, Predictive Value of Tests, Psychometrics, Regression Analysis, Thinking, Young Adult, Executive Function
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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