The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Place of Truth in Epistemology
Abstract
Suppose we think that knowledge is belief that is both true and derives from intellectual virtue. And if we also assume that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, then where does the value of knowledge in addition to truth come from? This chapter provides an answer to the value problem by arguing that truth is the only fundamental epistemic value (with qualifications for values as understanding that is not directly connected to knowledge.) It suggests that humans prefer their epistemic success to be attributable to their own doing. More specifically, there is a so-called ‘performance value’: that is, the kind value afforded to a belief performance which normally produces truth belief when operating in a suitable environment. Such performances can have this value even when the acquired belief is false. But the chief intellectual good involves getting the truth through the quality of one's performance.
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Cites
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100037943 · Cited by 2,686
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press (1999) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/229 · Cited by 235
Self-citationPrinciplism and Its Alleged Competitors
Beauchamp, T. L. (1995) · Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal · doi:10.1353/ken.0.0111 · Cited by 147
Cited by
Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
Lackey, J. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x · Cited by 388
Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
Fricker, M. (2016) · The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance · doi:10.1017/9780511820076.010 · Cited by 243
Metadata
- Authors
- Sosa, E.
- Venue
- Intellectual Virtue
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-09-04
- Pages
- 155-180
- OpenAlex
- W2506399245
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 30.69
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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