Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Abstract
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.
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The UAL approach is not compatible with higher-order thought (HOT) theories of the type defended by Carruthers (2000), Rosenthal (2005) and LeDoux (2019).
“First, the UAL approach, while compatible with many specific theories about the nature of consciousness, is not compatible with higher-order thought (HOT) theories of the type defended by Carruthers (2000), Rosenthal (2005) and LeDoux (2019).”
From Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions (2020) · cites this paper as Carruthers (2000)
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- Authors
- Carruthers, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Sheffield (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Carruthers, Peter
- ORCID
- Carruthers, Peter
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-28
- OpenAlex
- W4205543764
- Cited by
- 632
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 139 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 16.76
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, higher-order thought, naturalism, problem of consciousness, subjectivity, mind-brain relationship, neural basis of consciousness
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