The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Abstract
This study explores the relation between knowledge, reasons and justification. It argues that you can rely on what you know since what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on your reasons. But the assumption that knowledge allows for a chance of error makes this a controversial position in epistemology.
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Citations
Cited by
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1
Ross, J., & Schroeder, M. (2014) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.x · Cited by 279
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES
Miller, B., & Record, I. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.11 · Cited by 153
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Fantl, J., & McGrath, M.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-11-05
- OpenAlex
- W1582170695
- Cited by
- 790
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 32.09
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Knowledge in an Uncertain World. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001
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- Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199550623.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.