The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Open accessAbstract
An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substantive proposals concerning knowledge and justification.
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“Safety* If S were to believe that p, then relative to her perspective, it could not easily be false that p.”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Whiting, 2020
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Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028 · cited 1×
“In response, I consider separately a posteriori necessary truths, for example, that water is H2O, and a priori necessary truths, for example, that 1+1 2 (cf. Kripke 1980).”
Background(2000) · Cited by 5,055
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Gettier, E. L. (1963) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 · Cited by 3,127
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2024) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.61.4.08 · Cited by 2,329
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Lewis, D. (1979) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215339 · Cited by 1,610
Smith, D. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,281
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,267
Contemporary debates in epistemology
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0232 · Cited by 969
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cited by
Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value
McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198810322.001.0001 · Cited by 120
The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.001.0001 · Cited by 48
Self-citationClarke‐Doane, J., & Baras, D. (2019) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12643 · Cited by 28
Schmidt, E., Putora, P. M., & Fijten, R. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00834-9 · Cited by 14
“We will rely on a version of the principle that draws on Whiting ( 2020 ), which we call Safety*.”
Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability
Boult, C. (2023) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqad053 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Whiting, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Southampton (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Whiting, Daniel
- ORCID
- Whiting, Daniel
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2018-09-22
- Volume
- 197
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 3593-3609
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2893012490
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 15 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 29.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/K008188/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- knowledge, epistemic justification, epistemic safety, epistemology
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.