Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology
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Abstract
This chapter explores why belief in superhuman agents (gods) is historically and culturally common by engaging the natural properties of human thinking to function in ordinary natural and social environments. It starts by explaining what belief is, and its two kinds: reflective (provides fair representations of what someone believes in) and non-reflective (operates without conscious awareness in nature). It discusses why people believe in gods, and how god concepts arise. It also talks about the advantages of having these concepts; how they are connected to fortune, misfortune, and morality; and why people believe in a particular divine.
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Citations
Cited by
DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS GAIN LITTLE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION
Launonen, L. (2021) · Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science · doi:10.1111/zygo.12683 · Cited by 12
“(Barrett 2009, 88) Due to HADD, the idea of a god actively engaged in human affairs seems intuitively more credible.”
BackgroundGoodnick, L. (2016) · Open Theology · doi:10.1515/opth-2016-0003 · Cited by 11
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND FOLK THEISTIC BELIEF
Lim, D. (2016) · Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science · doi:10.1111/zygo.12304 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, J.
- Venue
- The Believing Primate
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-03-12
- Pages
- 76-99
- OpenAlex
- W2494428626
- Cited by
- 68
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 17.36
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557028.003.0004
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- Barrett, J. (2009). Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology. The Believing Primate. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199557028.003.0004
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.