The DOI matches its Crossref record; 134 of the 134 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Abstract
One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. The book argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. The book also argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. On the whole, this book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or phronesis — an excellence of deliberating and making choices — and argues that phronesis is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues. This book also examines issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and “the virtuous person”.
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Cites
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The ethics of scientific communication under uncertainty
Keohane, R. O., Lane, M., & Oppenheimer, M. (2014) · Politics, Philosophy & Economics · doi:10.1177/1470594x14538570 · Cited by 141
Paton, A., & Kotzee, B. (2021) · Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine · doi:10.1177/1363459319889102 · Cited by 26
The situationist critique of virtue ethics
Sreenivasan, G. (2013) · The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics · doi:10.1017/cco9780511734786.014 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Russell, D. C.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-04-01
- OpenAlex
- W4300068742
- Cited by
- 582
- References
- 134
- FWCI
- 6.06
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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