Cited by 3,068Philosophical Ethics and TheoryPolitical Philosophy and EthicsEthics, Aesthetics, and Art

Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980

Williams, Bernard·1981·Cambridge University Press eBooks

Abstract

A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139165860

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  • Asvaghosa, like Williams, might agree that even if a culture hero succeeds, he will not acquire a right that they accept what he has to say.

    “As ´vaghos ˙ a, like Williams, might agree that 'even if [a culture hero] succeeds, he will not acquire a right that they accept what he has to say (Williams 1981, pp. 23-24).'”

    From After the Unsilence of the Birds: Remembering Aśvaghoṣa’s Sundarī (2019) · cites this paper as Williams 1981

  • The concept of moral luck was introduced by Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981).

    “The concept of moral luck was introduced by the philosophers Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981).”

    From Moral Luck (2026) · cites this paper as Williams (1981)

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Authors
Williams, B.
Corresponding author
Williams, Bernard
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
1981-12-03
OpenAlex
W4247225418
Cited by
3,068
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 225 · 2025: 277 · 2024: 127 · 2023: 130 · 2022: 97 · 2021: 119 · 2020: 117 · 2019: 165 · 2018: 112 · 2017: 131 · 2016: 67 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 283 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 47
FWCI
13.99
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
Keywords
moral luck, utilitarianism, integrity, moral relativism, moral conflict, rational choice, ethics, Bernard Williams

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