The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Abstract
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.
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Cites
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science
Feigl, H., & Scriven, M. S. (1956) · Cited by 4,420
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5840 · Cited by 3,371
Davidson, D. (1963) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023177 · Cited by 2,938
Inference to the Best Explanation
Lipton, P. (2003) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203470855 · Cited by 2,130
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Goldman, A. I. (1976) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025679 · Cited by 1,870
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-0849 · Cited by 1,532
Smith, D. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,281
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Gettier, E. L. (1963) · Analysis · doi:10.2307/3326922 · Cited by 1,268
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation
SALMON, W. C. (2006) · University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt5vkdm7 · Cited by 1,224
New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind
Harman, G., & Chomsky, N. (2001) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2678384 · Cited by 1,203
Cited by
Hills, A. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12092 · Cited by 289
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education
Pritchard, D. (2013) · Journal of Philosophy of Education · doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12022 · Cited by 122
Self-citationWatson, L. (2016) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12316 · Cited by 39
Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
Küçükuncular, A. (2025) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies10060126 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2010-05-13
- OpenAlex
- W4253013424
- Cited by
- 454
- References
- 72
- FWCI
- 26.65
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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