The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality
Abstract
The standard view about epistemic modals includes a commitment to both descriptivism and factualism. Descriptivism is the thesis that epistemic modal talk serves fundamentally to describe some feature of reality. Factualism is the view that there is a certain class of facts, the facts about what is (epistemically) possible, or probable, or necessary. This chapter aims to develop an alternative to the factualist picture. The positive account the chapter sets out could plausibly be called a kind of expressivism about epistemic modal discourse, and a kind of nonfactualism about epistemic modality.
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Cites
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Cited by
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
Friedman, J. (2013) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12026 · Cited by 281
Stokke, A. (2014) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9250-6 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Yalcin, S.
- Venue
- Epistemic Modality
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2011-06-23
- Pages
- 295-332
- OpenAlex
- W2475397453
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 135.83
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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