Inductive Logic and the Probability that God Exists: Farewell to Sceptical Theism
Abstract
Suppose that the world contains n events, each of which is such that, judged in the light of the totality of known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, it would be morally wrong for anyone to allow the event in question. What is the logical probability — given only that evidence — that at least one of those n events is such that the totality of the rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, both known and unknown, of allowing that event makes that action morally wrong? Answering this question is the task of this chapter and it requires a rigorous application of inductive logic. It is shown that a Carnapian, structure-description approach entails that the probability must be less than(1n+1). But the existence of such an event is logically incompatible with the existence of God, and so the probability that God exists, relative to evidence of the sort described, must be less than (1n+1).
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For all we know, God might have further unknown reasons for preferring order or regularities that would cancel out God's possible unknown reasons for preferring disorder or mere order.
“for all we know, God might have further, unknown reasons for preferring order (or even regularities) that would cancel out God's possible unknown reasons for preferring disorder (or perhaps mere order).”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Tooley 2012
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The nomological argument for the existence of God
Hildebrand, T., & Metcalf, T. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12364 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
- Authors
- Tooley, M.
- Corresponding author
- Tooley, Michael
- ORCID
- Tooley, Michael
- Venue
- Probability in the Philosophy of Religion
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2012-04-26
- Pages
- 144-164
- OpenAlex
- W2483156184
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 5.46
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Keywords
- inductive logic, existence of God, logical probability, moral wrongness, probability bounds
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