The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Impassioned Belief
Abstract
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and partly constituted by desire-like states.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“We are not normally happy to say that what our interlocutor believes about morality is true, when we disagree in moral attitude (Ridge 2014).”
From Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism (2022) · cites this paper as Ridge 2014
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
Denning, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2022) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht202341718
Metadata
- Authors
- Ridge, M.
- Corresponding author
- Ridge, Michael
- ORCID
- Ridge, Michael
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2014-03-13
- OpenAlex
- W4205587233
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 15.27
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- expressivism, normative judgment, metaethics, semantics, practical reasoning, hybrid states, belief, desire
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
