Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
Open accessAbstract
Arguments from faultless disagreement appeal to the possibility of mistake-free disagreement as evidence for semantic relativism. Typically, these arguments focus on paradigmatically subjective topics such as taste, aesthetics, and comedy. Many philosophers hold that ethics is also a subjective topic. But so far, there has been little discussion of faultless disagreement in ethics. In this paper, I advance an argument from faultless moral disagreement, in favour of a relativist semantics for ethics.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that a modified, experimental version of the faultless-disagreement argument can support a relativist semantics for ethics, even though the standard intuition-based version cannot be dialectically extended to ethics. It claims that ordinary speakers’ responses to cross-cultural moral disagreement are best explained by a relativist-friendly hypothesis, which entails semantic relativism over contextualism and invariantism.
Key findings
- The standard argument from faultless disagreement cannot be effectively extended to ethics because metaethicists disagree about whether moral cases like Eccentria and Ford seem faultless; there is no consensus analogous to taste or aesthetics.
- Experimental data from Sarkissian et al. (2011) and Khoo and Knobe (2016) show a relation between cultural distance and faultlessness: same-culture condition tended to reject faultless disagreement, other-culture condition tended to suspend judgement, and extraterrestrial condition tended to endorse faultless disagreement.
- Khoo and Knobe also found that all three groups regarded the differences of opinion as genuine disagreements, and that participants tended to reject faultless disagreement in a non-moral extraterrestrial case while tending to endorse it in the moral case.
- The data support group/cultural relativism but undermine individualistic relativism, because individual relativism entails that intracultural disagreement can be faultless, while ordinary speakers deny this.
Methods
- The paper is a philosophical argument with two premises: the Ordinary Practice Claim (ordinary speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement) and the Explanation Claim (relativism better explains this than rival descriptivist views).
- It draws on existing experimental studies: Sarkissian et al. (2011), which exclusively recruited undergraduates, and Khoo and Knobe (2016), which recruited participants with average ages of 28, 29, and 36 across three experiments via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
- Participants were divided into same-culture, other-culture, and extraterrestrial conditions and asked whether at least one party must be mistaken or whether both could be correct; Khoo and Knobe additionally tested rejection and perceptions of disagreement. The paper compares relativism, contextualism, and invariantism as explanations of these results.
Limitations
- The paper states that it leaves expressivist and hybrid-expressivist semantics for another occasion and remains neutral on whether nondescriptivist theories may provide a better account.
- It states that the experimental data are insufficiently fine-grained to adjudicate the contextualist points, so subsection 3.3 appeals to readers’ intuitions rather than the data.
- It states that the data provide at most qualified support for relativism, that the extraterrestrial condition is far-fetched and shows only weak endorsement, and that cultural relativism is assumed in what follows. Evident from the text: the paper presents no new empirical study and relies on prior experiments and philosophical intuition.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
13 of 32 cited sources checked · 11 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation
Both studies found a striking relation between cultural distance and intuitions of faultlessness.
“Importantly, both studies found a striking relation between cultural distance and intuitions of faultlessness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked - Findingown data
The results show quite clearly that respondents take cultural distance to be relevant.
“However, these results show quite clearly that respondents take cultural distance to be relevant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Participants' attitudes in fact differed sharply across the two questions.
“However, participants' attitudes in fact differed sharply across the two questions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Sarkissian et al. 2011 source
- Findingcitation
Khoo and Knobe (2016) tried and failed to find an effect of cultural distance on non-moral disagreement.
“However, (Khoo and Knobe 2016) tried and failed to find any such effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Khoo and Knobe 2016 source
Experiment 3’s Methods (§2.4.1) show that Khoo and Knobe tested a non-moral disagreement involving an extraterrestrial speaker. Its Results (§2.4.2) found no significant difference between rejection and incorrectness ratings for that vignette. But they did not vary cultural distance in the non-moral conditions, so this was not a failed test of cultural distance’s effect on non-moral disagreement. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationreasoning
There is reason to doubt that the results depend on idiosyncratic undergraduate relativism.
“So there is reason to doubt that these results depend on idiosyncratic undergraduate relativism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Sarkissian et al. 2011 source
Study 2 and its Discussion report that a Singaporean student sample showed the same pattern as the American undergraduates, giving reason to doubt that the results reflect an idiosyncrasy of contemporary American culture. The paper does not establish that the pattern extends beyond students, so it does not fully address undergraduate-specific relativism. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Khoo and Knobe 2016 source
- Findingcitation
The results suggest that ordinary speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement, at least in contexts involving extreme cultural distance.
“But prima facie, they suggest that ordinary speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement, at least in contexts involving extreme cultural distance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked - Findingown data
In ordinary contexts, speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement.
“Ordinary Practice Claim: in ordinary contexts, speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement.”
- Also stated in: § Recall the · plain
“Ordinary Practice Claim: in ordinary contexts, speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Recall the · plain
- Findingreasoning
The data confirm the results of earlier studies, such as Goodwin and Darley (2008), which do not focus on cultural variation.
“In this respect, the data we have discussed confirm the results of earlier studies, such as (Goodwin and Darley 2008) 11 which do not focus on cultural variation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Goodwin and Darley 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingown data
Ordinary speakers' attitudes appear to be sensitive to cultural variation.
“However, we have also seen that ordinary speakers' attitudes appear to be sensitive to cultural variation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The data suggest that ordinary speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement in some cases.
“We have seen that the data do suggest that ordinary speakers endorse the possibility of faultless moral disagreement in some cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
There is reason to accept a relativist moral semantics over rival descriptivist views.
“Conclusion: there is reason to accept a relativist moral semantics over rival (descriptivist) views.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Faultless disagreement provides evidence for semantic relativism in ethics.
“Thus, faultless disagreement does provide evidence for semantic relativism in ethics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Metaethicists disagree about whether disagreements like Eccentria and Ford's seem faultless.
“Metaethicists disagree about whether disagreements like this one seem faultless.4”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
In its standard form, the argument from faultless disagreement cannot be effectively extended to ethics.
“I argue that, in its standard form, this argument cannot be effectively extended to ethics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Putting an experimental spin on arguments from faultless disagreement makes it possible to extend these arguments to ethics in a dialectically effective manner.
“Therefore, putting an experimental spin on arguments from faultless disagreement makes it possible to extend these arguments to ethics, in a dialectically effective manner.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The experimental insight into how ordinary people think and speak about moral disagreement is neutral between competing meta-ethical perspectives.
- Interpretationreasoning
The Ordinary Practice Claim is better explained by relativism than by rival descriptivist views.
“Explanation Claim: the Ordinary Practice Claim is better explained by relativism than by rival (descriptivist) views.”
- Also stated in: § 3. THE EXPLANATION CLAIM · plain
“In this section, I argue that the Explanation claim is true.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 3. THE EXPLANATION CLAIM · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
A modified version of the argument from faultless disagreement can be effectively extended to ethics.
“However, I argue that a modified version of the argument can be effectively extended to ethics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Relativism outperforms other descriptivist theories on the issue of faultless moral disagreement.
“Thus, I claim only that relativism outperforms other descriptivist theories on this issue.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The data provide at most qualified support for relativism.
“Thus, the data provide at most qualified support for relativism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A separate claim, which best explains the data, entails relativism.
“Instead, I argue that a separate claim, which best explains the data, entails relativism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A certain explanation of the data entails relativism.
“First, I show that a certain explanation of the data entails relativism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The Relativist-friendly Hypothesis entails relativism.
“Thus, the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is true only if relativism is true, because relativism is the only view with which the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is compatible.”
- Also stated in: § 3.1. The Relativist's Preferred Explanation of the Ordinary Practice Claim · plain
“Therefore, if the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is true, it follows that relativism is true.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The only alternatives to relativism are contextualism and invariantism.
- Also stated in: § 3.1. The Relativist's Preferred Explanation of the Ordinary Practice Claim · plain
- Interpretationown data
The main data reviewed show exactly the pattern of results that group/cultural relativism predicts.
“This is because the main data which we have reviewed show exactly the pattern of results that group/cultural relativism predicts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Cultural relativism will be assumed in what follows.
- Interpretationreasoning
The Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is incompatible with contextualism.
“Second, it is incompatible with contextualism because if contextualism is true, while both parties may believe permissibly, the contents of their attitudes will be straightforwardly compatible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: If contextualism is true, while both parties may believe permissibly, the contents of their attitudes will be straightforwardly compatible.
- Interpretationcitation
It does not seem that an effect of the relevant kind explains the main findings.
“Thus, it does not seem that an effect of the relevant kind explains the main findings.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Results of this type inevitably contain a certain amount of noise.
“Thus, results of this type inevitably contain a certain amount of noise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
It is reasonable to think that participants in earlier studies default to the assumption that characters in the vignettes are members of the same culture.
“It is reasonable to think (as Sarkissian and colleagues [2011] argue) that participants in such experiments default to the assumption that characters in the vignettes are members of the same culture.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sarkissian and colleagues [2011]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
This explanation is superior to rivals.
“Then, I argue that this explanation is superior to rivals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
If invariantism is true, cultural distance is straightforwardly orthogonal to the possibility of faultless disagreement.
“After all, if invariantism is true, cultural distance is straightforwardly orthogonal to the possibility of faultless disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Relativism is compatible with the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis.
“Relativism, notice, is compatible with the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis because relativism is compatible with both contradictory content and mutually permissible belief.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The result that respondents take cultural distance to be relevant is favourable for the relativist.
“And this is a favourable result for the relativist.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The data do not undermine the support that cultural or group relativism receives from the data.
“On the other hand, this does not undermine the support that cultural or group relativism (that is, the view that truth is relativised to the standards of an assessor's group) does receive from the data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Cultural relativism will be assumed in what follows.
- Interpretationreasoning
It is unsurprising, given the results surveyed, that earlier studies have tended to find that ordinary speakers reject faultless moral disagreement.
“Thus, it is unsurprising, given the results we have surveyed here, that these studies have tended to find that ordinary speakers reject faultless moral disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is incompatible with invariantism.
“First, it is incompatible with invariantism because if invariantism is true, then at least one party to any disagreement believes something not true, and thus believes impermissibly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: If invariantism is true, then at least one party to any disagreement believes something not true, and thus believes impermissibly.
- Interpretationcitation
Even if the denial data are thrown out, Khoo and Knobe's results still suggest that ordinary speakers endorse faultless genuine disagreement.
“Thus, even if we throw out the denial data, Khoo and Knobe's results still suggest that ordinary speakers endorse faultless (genuine) disagreement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Khoo and Knobe
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
A similar problem applies to the contextualist's account of linguistic rejection.
“Second, a similar problem applies to the contextualist's account of linguistic rejection.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Since relativists can themselves appeal to disagreement in attitude, there is no need for relativists to hold that these predictions about use of the ordinary truth predicate amount to a positive account of disagreement.
“Note also that since relativists can themselves appeal to disagreement in attitude, there is no need for relativists to hold that these predictions about use of the ordinary truth predicate amount to a positive account of disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The argument advanced here complements these arguments in an important way: it shows that there is reason to think that relativism accurately models the contents of the moral claims we ordinarily make.
“Therefore, the argument I have advanced here complements these arguments in an important way: it shows that there is reason to think that relativism accurately models the contents of the moral claims we ordinarily make.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Relativism predicts that Eccentria can correctly say that what Ford believes is false simpliciter (and vice versa).
“As MacFarlane shows (2014: 106-107), this means that relativism predicts that Eccentria can correctly say that what Ford believes is false simpliciter (and vice versa).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites MacFarlane 2014 source
- Interpretationnone given
The Relativist-friendly Hypothesis straightforwardly entails semantic relativism.
“Furthermore, as we've also seen, the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis straightforwardly entails semantic relativism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
An experimental version of the argument from faultless disagreement provides reason to endorse a relativist semantics for ethics.
“In this paper, I have argued that an experimental version of the argument from faultless disagreement provides reason to endorse a relativist semantics for ethics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
It would be very odd to admit that the content of another speaker's moral claim is true while rejecting the non-cognitive attitude that they putatively express in making the claim.
“It would be very odd to admit that the content of another speaker's moral claim is true while rejecting the non-cognitive attitude that they putatively express in making the claim.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Relativism does not face these problems.
“Importantly, relativism does not face these problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Contextualists, unlike invariantists, are able to endorse complete (not merely epistemic) faultlessness.
“Contextualists, unlike invariantists, are able to endorse complete (not merely epistemic) faultlessness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
This is not how we talk when we are engaged in canonical moral disagreement.
“But although we sometimes talk in this way, this is not how we talk when we are engaged in canonical moral disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If this is right, then metaethical relativists need neither endorse an error theory, nor propose any revision of ordinary language.
“If this is right, then metaethical relativists need neither endorse an error theory, nor propose any revision of ordinary language.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This experiment provides reason for skepticism about the Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis.
“Thus, this experiment provides reason for skepticism about the Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The intuitions to which these objections appeal are widely shared among philosophers.
“Importantly, the intuitions to which these objections appeal are widely shared among philosophers.21”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [21]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Study design and conductnone given
The experimental data are insufficiently fine-grained to adjudicate these points.
“This is because the experimental data are insufficiently fine-grained to adjudicate these points.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
We have reason to endorse semantic relativism over rival (descriptivist) views.
“Thus, it follows that we have reason to endorse semantic relativism over rival (descriptivist) views.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These cases do not support contextualism.
“Thus, these cases do not support contextualism.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The former intuitions, even if not the latter, plausibly constitute data worth explaining.
“Thus the former intuitions, even if not the latter, plausibly constitute data worth explaining.22”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The contextualist's appeal to disagreement in attitude, itself motivated by a need to explain the data, is dubious on holistic grounds.
“However, what these objections show is that the contextualist's appeal to disagreement in attitude, itself motivated by a need to explain the data, is dubious on holistic grounds.20”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is superior to rival (descriptivist) explanations of the data.
“In summary, we've seen that the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis is superior to rival (descriptivist) explanations of the data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
This gives us reason to accept the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis.
“This gives us reason to accept the Relativist-friendly Hypothesis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
We are not normally happy to say that what our interlocutor believes about morality is true, when we disagree in moral attitude.
“We are not normally happy to say that what our interlocutor believes about morality is true, when we disagree in moral attitude (Ridge 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ridge 2014 source
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 19
- May combine two claims. 11
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, and Knobe (2011) and Khoo and Knobe (2016) investigated ordinary speakers' attitudes towards faultless moral disagreement.
“In a pair of recent studies, Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, and Knobe (2011) and Khoo and Knobe (2016) investigated ordinary speaker's attitudes towards faultless moral disagreement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, and Knobe (2011) source
- cites Khoo and Knobe (2016)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSarkissian and colleagues (2011) tested the Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis and did not find evidence to support it.
“This is because Sarkissian and colleagues (2011) tested this hypothesis, and did not find evidence to support it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Sarkissian et al. 2011 source
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn these studies, the same-culture group tended to reject faultless disagreement, the other-culture group tended to suspend judgement, and the extraterrestrial group tended to endorse faultless disagreement.
“While the first group (same culture condition) tended to reject faultless disagree-ment, the second group (other culture condition) tended to suspend judgement, and the third group (extraterrestrial condition) tended to endorse faultless disagreement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Sarkissian et al. 2011 source
- cites Khoo and Knobe 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationThese data are consistent with the results of Goodwin and Darley (2008) and other similar studies.
“And furthermore, as Sarkissian and colleagues persuasively argue (2011: 485-486) these data are consistent with the results of (Goodwin and Darley 2008) and other similar studies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Sarkissian and colleagues (2011: 485-486)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Goodwin and Darley 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationKhoo and Knobe also tested for perceptions of disagreement directly, and this test found consistent endorsement of disagreement in all conditions, with a tendency to endorse faultlessness only across cultural distance.
“And this test found roughly the same pattern: consistent endorsement of disagreement in all conditions, with a tendency to endorse faultlessness only across cultural distance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Khoo and Knobe
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn one experiment, participants tended to reject faultless disagreement in the non-moral case while tending to endorse it in the moral case, both in the extraterrestrial condition.
“But in this experiment, participants tended to reject faultless disagreement in the non-moral case, while tending to endorse it in the moral case.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Khoo and Knobe 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenOrdinary speakers tend to be aware of the possibility that two individuals can morally disagree while both believe permissibly.
“(ii) ordinary speakers tend to be aware of this possibility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Belief is governed by a constitutive norm, according to which a belief is permissible just in case it is true at the believer's context of assessment.
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe second study found a similar pattern with respect to faultlessness, and all three groups regarded the relevant differences of opinion as involving genuine disagreements.
“The second study tested, in addition, for intuitions about disagreement.This study found a similar pattern with respect to faultlessness, but also found that all three groups regarded the relevant differences of opinion as involving genuine disagreements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Khoo and Knobe 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenRecent experimental results give insight into how ordinary people think and speak about moral disagreement.
“Conveniently, recent experimental results give us some insight into how ordinary people think and speak about moral disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenNo matter how plausible a statement is, there will always be a non-negligible proportion of respondents who deny it.
“This is because no matter how plausible a statement is, there will always be a non-negligible proportion of respondents who deny it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningSince the experimental case is quite straightforward, the second worry does not undermine the argument presented here.
“Thus, since the experimental case is quite straightforward, the second worry does not undermine the argument presented here.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis predicts little or no difference between answers to the conditions.
“The Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis predicts little or no difference between answers to the conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Condition 1 of Sarkissian et al.'s experiment mimics condition 1 of the main experiments.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIt is possible for two individuals to morally disagree such that one believes p, the other believes not-p, and both parties believe permissibly in accordance with the constitutive norm governing belief.
“Relativist-friendly Hypothesis: (i) it's possible for two individuals to morally disagree such that one believes p, the other believes ¬p, and both parties believe permissibly (that is, in accordance with the constitutive norm governing belief)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Belief is governed by a constitutive norm, according to which a belief is permissible just in case it is true at the believer's context of assessment.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIndividualistic moral relativism is undermined by the data, because it entails that intracultural disagreement can be faultless, and the data suggest that ordinary speakers deny this.
“But rather than being supported, these individual relativist views are undermined by the data.This is because these views entail that intracultural disagreement can be faultless.And the data suggest that ordinary speakers deny this.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe Invariantist-friendly Hypothesis is compatible with invariantism.
“As Schafer 2011 points out, this hypothesis is compatible with invariantism, and is a natural way for invariantists to think about apparent cases of faultless disagreement.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schafer 2011
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningRelativism entails that Eccentria and Ford could faultlessly disagree, for both Eccentria and Ford believe propositions that are true at their respective contexts of assessment.
“If this is correct, then relativism entails that Eccentria and Ford could faultlessly disagree, for both Eccentria and Ford believe propositions that are true at their respective contexts of assessment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Belief is governed by a constitutive norm, according to which a belief is permissible just in case it is true at the believer's context of assessment.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenOrdinary speakers should be able to understand cases which are merely unlikely, while conceptually straightforward.
“Ordinary speakers should be able to understand cases which are merely unlikely, while conceptually straightforward (e.g., Descartes's demon).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe noise explains, consistent with invariantism, why we see only weak rejection of faultless disagreement in the same-culture condition, and, consistent with relativism, why we see only weak acceptance in the extraterrestrial condition.
“And this plausibly explains, consistent with invariantism, why we see only weak rejection of faultless disagreement in the sameculture condition.Equally though, it explains, consistent with relativism, why we see only weak acceptance in the extraterrestrial condition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenContextualism entails that apparently clashing moral beliefs in fact have contents which are straightforwardly compatible.
“This is because, as we've seen, contextualism entails that apparently clashing moral beliefs in fact have contents which are straightforwardly compatible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premiseown dataThere are cases in which we do talk in this way.
“Admittedly, there are cases in which we do talk in this way.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenLinguistic rejection can target attitudes expressed at the level of pragmatics.
“Linguistic rejection, furthermore, can also target attitudes expressed at the level of pragmatics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationContextualists hold that moral utterances can express clashing non-cognitive attitudes at the level of pragmatics.
“These intuitions are predicted by contextualism, because contextualists hold that moral utterances can express clashing non-cognitive attitudes at the level of pragmatics.19”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Finlay 2017 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOn the contextualist account, if Ford expresses his moral judgement, then Eccentria should be able to correctly say to him that what he said is true but that she is happy with demolishing the earth to make way for a hyperspace bypass.
“For on this account, if Ford expresses his moral judgement, then Eccentria should be able to correctly say to him:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe rejection data can be explained by the notion of disagreement in attitude.
“Thus, the rejection data can also be explained by the notion of disagreement in attitude.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningOn the contextualist account, Eccentria should be able to correctly say to Ford that what he says about morality is true and that she believes everything he believes about morality, but that they disagree about morality.
“First, on this account, Eccentria should be able to correctly say to Ford”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationArguments for moral relativism often appeal to considerations which are not straightforwardly linguistic.
“Arguments for moral relativism often appeal to considerations which are not straightforwardly linguistic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Street 2006 source
- cites Harman 1977
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Rowland 2017
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUnless we can also show that there is linguistic evidence for relativism, these arguments at best advance relativism as a revisionary semantics and, at worst, lead to an error theory.
“However, unless we can also show that there is linguistic evidence for relativism, these arguments at best advance relativism as a revisionary semantics and, at worst, lead to an error theory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
There has been little discussion of faultless disagreement in ethics.
“But so far, there has been little discussion of faultless disagreement in ethics.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The experimental insight into how ordinary people think and speak about moral disagreement is neutral between competing meta-ethical perspectives.
“And importantly, this insight is neutral between competing meta-ethical perspectives.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Cultural relativism will be assumed in what follows.
“In what follows, cultural relativism will be assumed.12”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Belief is governed by a constitutive norm, according to which a belief is permissible just in case it is true at the believer's context of assessment.
“An assumption here is that belief is governed by a constitutive norm, according to which a belief is permissible just in case it is true at the believer's context of assessment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The only alternatives to relativism are contextualism and invariantism.
“Simply, because it is incompatible with the only alternatives: contextualism and invariantism.13”
The paper relies on this without support.
If invariantism is true, then at least one party to any disagreement believes something not true, and thus believes impermissibly.
“First, it is incompatible with invariantism because if invariantism is true, then at least one party to any disagreement believes something not true, and thus believes impermissibly.14”
The paper relies on this without support.
If contextualism is true, while both parties may believe permissibly, the contents of their attitudes will be straightforwardly compatible.
“Second, it is incompatible with contextualism because if contextualism is true, while both parties may believe permissibly, the contents of their attitudes will be straightforwardly compatible.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Condition 1 of Sarkissian et al.'s experiment mimics condition 1 of the main experiments.
“But second, condition 1 of this experiment mimics condition 1 of the main experiments.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The statement presented to experimental participants (Dylan buys an expensive new knife and tests its sharpness by randomly stabbing a passerby) does not lack a determinate moral status.
“This is because the statement presented to experimental participants was:”
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Adams, D. 2007. The Hitch-Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy, New York: Penguin Random House.
- Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaplan, D. 1989. "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demon- stratives and Other Indexicals, " in Themes From Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thanks to an anonymous referee for clarifying this point. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Plunkett, D., and T. Sundell. 2013. "Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms, " Philoso- phers Imprint 13(23): 1-37.
- Authors
- Denning, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Corresponding author
- Denning, Patrick
- Venue
- Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 122-133
- ISSN
- 2161-2234 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4366697789
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Thought A Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- faultless disagreement, moral relativism, semantic relativism, moral disagreement, moral subjectivity
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