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Assessment Sensitivity
Abstract
After surveying various ways in which truth relativism has been characterized in the literature, this chapter argues that it is best understood as the view that some of our thought and talk is assessment‐sensitive. Assessment sensitivity is understood by analogy with ordinary contextual sensitivity—or, as it is called here, use sensitivity. Just as the truth of uses of ordinary context‐sensitive sentences depends on features of the context in which they are used, so the truth of uses of assessment‐sensitive sentences depends on features of the context in which they are assessed. We describe how standard semantic frameworks must be changed to make room for assessment sensitivity.
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Relativism predicts that Eccentria can correctly say that what Ford believes is false simpliciter (and vice versa).
“As MacFarlane shows (2014: 106-107), this means that relativism predicts that Eccentria can correctly say that what Ford believes is false simpliciter (and vice versa).”
From Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism (2022) · cites this paper as MacFarlane 2014
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Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
Denning, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2022) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht202341718
Metadata
- Authors
- Macfarlane, J.
- Corresponding author
- Macfarlane, John
- Venue
- Assessment Sensitivity
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2014-04-17
- Pages
- 44-70
- OpenAlex
- W4250499009
- Cited by
- 30
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 14.69
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- truth relativism, assessment sensitivity, context sensitivity, semantic framework, truth conditions, pragmatics
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