Disagreement
Abstract
This chapter examines the differences between disagreements in idealized contexts and everyday contexts. While puzzles concerning the epistemic significance of disagreement are typically motivated by looking at the widespread and persistent disagreements in the real world, almost all of the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement has focused on cases idealized peer disagreement. This fact might itself be puzzling since it does not seem that we ever encounter disagreements that meet the relevant idealized conditions. This chapter lays out the conditions of an idealized case of peer disagreement and motivates the Equal Weight View of disagreement in such circumstances. It proceeds to unpack the implications of stripping away each of the idealized conditions, and in doing, shows both why it is important to focus on idealized cases of peer disagreement as well as how the lessons from idealized cases carry over to everyday disagreements.
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Conciliationism cannot sustain itself on its own terms and is compelled to reject its own validity.
“This leads to the conclusion that conciliationism cannot sustain itself on its own terms and is compelled to reject its own validity.24”
From Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement (2025) · cites this paper as [24]
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Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement
Aslantatar, N. (2025) · İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi · doi:10.29288/ilted.1657637 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Matheson, J.
- Corresponding author
- Matheson, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Matheson, Jonathan
- Venue
- The Ethics of Belief
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2014-08-14
- Pages
- 315-330
- OpenAlex
- W4244012143
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic disagreement, peer disagreement
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