Conciliationism as Epistemic Concession in Religious Peer Disagreement

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Conciliationism negatively affects research processes.

“Similarly, Kirk Lougheed argues that conciliationism negatively affects research processes and maintains that an argument against conciliationism is necessary to prevent harm to scientific practices:”

• cites [20] Littlejohn, Clayton. “Disagreement and Defeat”. Disagreement and Skepticism. ed. Diego Machuca. 169-192. New York: Routledge, 2013. Lougheed, Kirk. “The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements”. Informal Logic 38/2 (2018), 263–292. sourcePartly supported

  Section 2.1 argues that remaining steadfast in some research contexts can yield epistemic benefits, and section 3.4 says researchers who fail to remain steadfast may lose those benefits. This supports the concern about conciliationism’s effects on inquiry, but the paper defends a limited form of non-conciliationism; it does not say that an argument against conciliationism is necessary to prevent harm to scientific practices generally. Page numbers were not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Limiting the process of inquiry and critical reflection risks undermining not only individual epistemic confidence but also broader progress in both scientific and religious domains.

“The central concern here is that limiting the process of inquiry and critical reflection-both of which are necessary for the development and refinement of belief-risks undermining not only individual epistemic confidence but also the broader progress in both scientific and religious domains.”

May combine two claims.

According to the Torah, Bible, and Qur'an, Abraham rejected the dominant polytheism of his milieu, affirming monotheism and engaging in a deep conflict with his cultural environment.

“According to the Torah, Bible, and Qur'an, Abraham rejected the dominant polytheism of his milieu, instead affirming monotheism, engaging in a deep conflict with his cultural environment.”

• cites [18] Kornblith, Hilary. “Belief in the Face of Controversy”. Disagreement. ed. R. Feldman, T. Warfield. 29-52. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Kornblith, Hilary. “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?”. Disagreement and Skepticism. ed. Diego Machuca. 131-149. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kripke, Saul A. “On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge”. Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers 1. 27-51. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism may inhibit individuals from defending their beliefs even when those beliefs are true and may render the essential processes of critical reflection and inquiry unnecessary.

“This, in turn, may inhibit individuals from defending their beliefs-even when those beliefs are true-and may render the essential processes of critical reflection and inquiry unnecessary.”

May combine two claims.

The revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality.

“Consequently, this study argues that this revised steadfastness framework offers a more defensible and epistemically responsible alternative to conciliationism, preserving the integrity of religious, inquiry while upholding the demands of epistemic rationality.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges and is an unsustainable position.

“I argue that conciliationism faces serious epistemic challenges, rendering it an unsustainable position.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Rational agents ought to fulfill the function of evidence by adhering to the proposition indicated by the available evidence.

“In such cases, rational agents ought to fulfill the function of evidence by adhering to the proposition indicated by the available evidence.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In cases where conciliationism emerges as the sole defeater against p, one should not diminish their belief in or confidence toward p merely due to the presence of peer disagreement.

“Rather, I aim to emphasize that in cases where conciliationism emerges as the sole defeater against p, one should not diminish their belief in or confidence toward p merely due to the presence of peer disagreement.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Suspending judgment in the face of disagreement limits argumentation by reducing the number of available premises and thereby slows intellectual progress.

“Suspending judgment in the face of disagreement limits argumentation by reducing the number of available premises and thereby slows intellectual progress.”

• cites [19] Kur’ân-ı Kerîm Meâli, çev. Halil Altuntaş-Muzaffer Şahin. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2009. Kütükcü, Elif. İhtilafın Epistemolojisi ve Dini Çeşitlilik. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022. Lackey, Jennifer. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance”. Social Epistemology. ed. Adrian Haddock vd. 298–325. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Lee, Matthew. “Conciliationism without Uniqueness”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 88/1 (2012), 161-188.Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

In the absence of genuine rebutting defeaters, it is epistemically reasonable for individuals to retain their beliefs and to continue engaging in inquiry to strengthen the justification for those beliefs.

“In the absence of genuine rebutting defeaters, it is epistemically reasonable for individuals to retain their beliefs and to continue engaging in inquiry to strengthen the justification for those beliefs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

If a defeater is strong enough to lower the believer's confidence below a critical threshold θ, rendering the belief no longer rationally maintainable, then one ought to abandon or revise that belief.

“If the defeater is strong enough to lower the believer's confidence below a critical threshold (θ), rendering the belief no longer rationally maintainable, then one ought to abandon or revise that belief.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a rational confidence threshold θ appropriate to the stakes of inquiry that can be applied to religious belief.

The quote only partly states this claim.

In contexts of religious peer disagreement, an agent S who holds belief φ1 in p on evidential basis E and confidence C may rationally maintain φ1 upon learning that an epistemic peer S1 holds a conflicting belief φ2 if and only if all four conditions obtain: independent justification, absence of genuine defeat, confidence threshold, and meta-belief endorsement.

“In contexts of religious peer disagreement, an agent S who at time t holds belief φ₁ in proposition p on evidential basis E and confidence level C may rationally maintain φ₁ upon learning at time t 2 that an epistemic peer S 1 holds a conflicting belief φ₂ if and only if all four conditions obtain:”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There is a rational confidence threshold θ appropriate to the stakes of inquiry that can be applied to religious belief.

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

Conciliationism can prompt individuals to unjustifiably diminish their confidence in their beliefs and to adopt an unwarranted level of epistemic humility.

“In the context of religious disagreement, conciliationism can prompt individuals to unjustifiably diminish their confidence in their beliefs and to adopt an unwarranted level of epistemic humility.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Adopting a conciliatory stance even in trivial matters, or in cases where making a decision is far more reasonable than withholding judgment, can impose unnecessary cognitive and psychological burdens.

“Moreover, adopting a conciliatory stance even in trivial matters, or in cases where making a decision is far more reasonable than withholding judgment, can impose unnecessary cognitive and psychological burdens.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism may lead to unwarranted skepticism or excessive moderation.

“Such an approach may lead to unwarranted skepticism or excessive moderation.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Conciliation or dynamic models such as those advanced by Lackey, Lougheed, or Kelly may be reasonable in practical, everyday situations.

“While I argue in the second section that conciliation or dynamic models such as those advanced by Lackey, Lougheed, or Kelly may be reasonable in practical, everyday situations, I maintain that in domains like religion which affect one's life far more deeply than, say, a mistaken restaurant bill, treating peer disagreement as evidentially significant appears epistemically implausible.”

• cites [13] Enoch, David. “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement”. Mind 119/476 (2010), 953-997. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The principle that one should reduce confidence in their belief to match that of an epistemic peer in cases of disagreement is problematic not only in terms of interpersonal epistemic dynamics but also with respect to broader epistemological concerns.

“The principle that one should reduce confidence in their belief to match that of an epistemic peer in cases of disagreement is problematic not only in terms of interpersonal epistemic dynamics but also with respect to broader epistemological concerns.”

May combine two claims.

The mere existence of a conflicting belief does not, in itself, amount to a rebutting defeater; rather, it merely highlights that the parties involved hold different convictions without providing independent evidence for which side is correct.

“The mere existence of a conflicting belief does not, in itself, amount to a rebutting defeater; rather, it merely highlights that the parties involved hold different convictions without providing independent evidence for which side is correct.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: In the majority of religious disagreements, opposing views arise from differing interpretations of epistemic sources or alternative claims rooted in distinct religious traditions.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The relevant defeater must be something other than mere peer disagreement and should not be entirely subjective in nature or grounded solely in a personal inference.

“In this context, it is important to highlight that the relevant defeater must be something other than mere peer disagreement and should not be entirely subjective in nature or grounded solely in a personal inference.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Individuals' continued efforts to develop their positions contribute to their personal epistemic growth and to the long-term benefit of scientific communities.

“Moreover, individuals' continued efforts to develop their positions contribute not only to their personal epistemic growth but also to the long-term benefit of scientific communities.”

• cites [19] Kur’ân-ı Kerîm Meâli, çev. Halil Altuntaş-Muzaffer Şahin. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2009. Kütükcü, Elif. İhtilafın Epistemolojisi ve Dini Çeşitlilik. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022. Lackey, Jennifer. “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance”. Social Epistemology. ed. Adrian Haddock vd. 298–325. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Lee, Matthew. “Conciliationism without Uniqueness”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 88/1 (2012), 161-188.Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

These examples suggest that conciliationism, when adopted as a universal response to disagreement, risks undermining both the integrity of belief and the epistemic virtues that sustain inquiry.

“These examples suggest that conciliationism when adopted as a universal response to disagreement, risks undermining both the integrity of belief and the epistemic virtues that sustain inquiry.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Unless confronted with a genuine defeater that renders belief in p impossible, it would be irrational for a person to abandon their belief.

“Unless confronted with a genuine defeater-one that renders belief in p impossible-it would be irrational for a person to abandon their belief.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The mere existence of disagreement does not constitute evidence-warranting revision of one's beliefs or judgments; it can be entirely rational to retain confidence in one's position in the face of a peer disagreement.

“The steadfastness maintains that the mere existence of disagreement does not constitute evidence-warranting revision of one's beliefs or judgments; rather, it can be entirely rational to retain confidence in one's position in the face of a peer disagreement.”

May combine two claims.

Copernicus's heliocentric model and Einstein's theory of relativity both constituted radical departures from the dominant paradigms of their times.

“Copernicus's heliocentric model and Einstein's theory of relativity both constituted radical departures from the dominant paradigms of their times.”

• cites [17] Kelly, Thomas. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. ed. John Hawthorne, Tamar Gendler. 167-196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

In contexts where epistemic authority and parity are indeterminate, determining who counts as an authority and whether two parties are genuinely on a par gives rise to serious methodological uncertainties regarding both the rational revision of beliefs and the demarcation of conciliation's proper limits.

“In such contexts, determining who counts as an authority and whether two parties are genuinely on a par gives rise to serious methodological uncertainties regarding both the rational revision of beliefs and the demarcation of conciliation's proper limits.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

Conciliationism is inherently self-defeating.

“One of the most significant criticisms is that conciliationism is inherently self-defeating.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationists must either continue defending conciliationism and thereby contradict their own principles, or abandon the view and thereby eliminate its universal validity.

“Bu durum bir paradoks doğurur: Uzlaşımcılar ya uzlaşımcılığı savunmaya devam ederek kendi ilkeleriyle çelişmek ya da bu görüşü terk ederek onun evrensel geçerliliğini ortadan kaldırmak durumundadırlar.”

May combine two claims.

This outcome fosters an epistemic stance that distances individuals from the truth, encourages them to undervalue their evidence, and leads to an unwarranted dependence on the epistemic authority of others.

“This outcome fosters an epistemic stance that distances individuals from the truth, encourages them to undervalue their evidence, and leads to an unwarranted dependence on the epistemic authority of others.”

May combine two claims.

The core principle of conciliationism, the requirement to revise one's belief in the face of disagreement, undermines the formation of rational belief and leads toward skepticism.

“The core principle of conciliationism-namely, the requirement to revise one's belief in the face of disagreement-emerges as a practice that undermines the formation of rational belief and leads toward skepticism.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Conciliationism's core principle is the requirement to revise one's belief in the face of disagreement.

May combine two claims.

The proposed steadfastness framework does not entirely exclude belief revision but does not regard lowering one's degree of confidence merely because of the existence of disagreement as necessary.

“Bu çerçeve, inanç revizyonunu bütünüyle dışlamamakta; ancak sırf ihtilafın varlığı nedeniyle inanca güven derecesinin düşürülmesini de zorunlu görmemektedir.”

May combine two claims.

The epistemic concessions demanded by conciliationism are excessive and undermine rational belief formation.

“In sum, these critiques indicate that the epistemic concessions demanded by conciliationism are excessive and undermine rational belief formation.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism faces two closely connected challenges: its tendency to lead to skepticism and the internal inconsistency this tendency reveals.

“Conciliationism faces two closely connected challenges: its tendency to lead to skepticism and the internal inconsistency this tendency reveals.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism fosters an environment conducive to skepticism, leading to widespread epistemic uncertainty.

“Third, conciliationism fosters an environment conducive to skepticism, leading to widespread epistemic uncertainty.”

May combine two claims.

The expectation that individuals should weaken their beliefs merely for the sake of reaching an agreement with their epistemic peers hampers the pursuit of knowledge, obstructs intellectual progress, and fosters a stance of unjustified suspension of judgment.

“The expectation that individuals should weaken their beliefs merely for the sake of reaching an agreement with their epistemic peers hampers the pursuit of knowledge, obstructs intellectual progress, and fosters a stance of unjustified suspension of judgment.”

May combine two claims.

Steadfastness can accommodate a meta-level endorsement, but conciliationism cannot.

“Steadfastness can accommodate such a meta-level endorsement; conciliationism cannot.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Independence Thesis holds that resolving a peer disagreement requires the parties to appeal to evidence independent of both their belief about p and the reasons supporting that belief.

“According to this thesis, resolving a peer disagreement requires the parties to appeal to evidence that is independent of both their belief about p and the reasons supporting that belief.49”

• cites [49]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The proposed steadfastness approach promotes intellectual progress by allowing individuals to develop their views in a justified manner.

“Ayrıca, bireylerin görüşlerini gerekçeli biçimde geliştirmelerine olanak tanıdığı için entelektüel ilerlemeyi de teşvik eder.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism must either apply its principle dogmatically or exempt itself arbitrarily.

“As a result, conciliationism must either apply its principle dogmatically or exempt itself arbitrarily.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The proposed steadfastness model preserves the integrity of religious and philosophical inquiry and remains faithful to the requirements of rational belief by making belief revision possible not merely as a reaction to disagreement but on epistemically sound grounds.

“Sonuç olarak, bu kararlılık modeli, inanç revizyonunu, yalnızca fikir ayrılığına tepki olarak değil, epistemik açıdan sağlam gerekçelere dayalı olarak mümkün kılarak dinî ve felsef î sorgulamanın bütünlüğünü korur ve rasyonel inancın gerekliliklerine sadık kalır.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism is not just self-undermining, but methodologically incoherent.

“The very need for a meta-belief clause thus exposes the structural gap in conciliationism and reinforces the charge that it is not just self-undermining, but methodologically incoherent.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Advocates of the Independence Thesis contend that, in the absence of any clear epistemic asymmetry between the two peers, neither party's position can be granted epistemic privilege.

“Advocates of the thesis contend that, in the absence of any clear epistemic asymmetry between the two peers, neither party's position can be granted epistemic privilege.51”

• cites [51]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The bootstrapping problem states that a belief can be considered rational merely because it is shared by multiple people.

“Bu sorun, bir inancın yalnızca birden çok kişi tarafından paylaşılması sebebiyle rasyonel kabul edilebileceğini ifade eder.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).

Conciliationism can assert the rationality of a false p merely because two equally confident epistemic peers have reached an agreement, regardless of the actual evidence.

“However, what if both individuals have misinterpreted E? Would conciliationism not be asserting the rationality of a false p merely because two equally confident epistemic peers have reached an agreement, regardless of the actual evidence?47”

• cites [47]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The revised steadfastness principle articulated in the paper offers a more defensible epistemic foundation by specifying four necessary conditions under which an agent may rationally maintain belief in the face of peer disagreement.

“In contrast, the revised steadfastness principle articulated here offers a more defensible epistemic foundation by specifying four necessary conditions under which an agent may rationally maintain belief in the face of peer disagreement:”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

The criterion for p's truth would not be the evidence but rather S's belief that p is true-a position that is not rationally tenable.

“In such a scenario, the criterion for p's truth would not be the evidence but rather S's belief that p is true-a position that, on its own, does not seem rationally tenable.”

May combine two claims.

The proposed steadfastness approach defends epistemic autonomy by granting the individual the right to use their reasoning faculties, and rejects the assumption that one may be mistaken merely because a disagreement occurred.

“Sunduğumuz kararlılık yaklaşımı, bireye akıl yürütme yetilerini kullanma hakkı tanıyarak epistemik özerkliği savunur ve sırf ihtilaf yaşandığı için hatalı olunabileceği varsayımını reddeder.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Elga offers no justification for this exemption.

“Third, Elga offers no justification for this exemption.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism is internally incoherent and fails to adhere to its own methodological principles.

“Given that a theory requiring its rejection entails a logical inconsistency, it follows that conciliationism is internally incoherent and fails to adhere to its own methodological principles.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism treats disagreement itself as a kind of defeater, effectively externalizing the authority of evidence to the mere fact of consensus.

“Conciliationism treats disagreement itself as a kind of defeater, effectively externalizing the authority of evidence to the mere fact of consensus.”

May combine two claims.

The expectation of belief revision in every disagreement weakens the stability of justified beliefs and can lead to epistemic concession.

“Her ihtilaf durumunda inanç revizyonu beklentisi, gerekçelendirilmiş inançların istikrarını zayıflatmakta ve epistemik tavize yol açabilmektedir.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism conflicts with the demands of epistemic rationality and encounters significant theoretical difficulties.

“This paper has argued that conciliationism conflicts with the demands of epistemic rationality and encounters significant theoretical difficulties.”

May combine two claims.

Such an approach weakens the evidence-based approach in belief formation and implies that rational justification can rest on consensus rather than objective evidence.

“Böyle bir yaklaşım, inanç oluşumunda delil temelli yaklaşımı zayıflatır ve rasyonel gerekçelendirmenin nesnel delilden ziyade fikir birliğine dayanabileceğini ima eder.”

May combine two claims.

The Revised Steadfastness Principle restores evidence's normative role and highlights conciliationism's dangerous tendency to displace it with consensus.

“In doing so, the Revised Steadfastness Principle restores evidence's normative role and highlights conciliationism's dangerous tendency to displace it with consensus.”

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism risks weakening the role of evidence and externalizing epistemic authority, which may result in inertia in the pursuit of truth.

“Finally, conciliationism risks weakening the role of evidence and externalizing epistemic authority, which may result in inertia in the pursuit of truth.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Skepticism persists even in the face of actual disagreement.

“Nonetheless, the precise contribution of Kornblith's distinction to the broader debate remains unclear; skepticism persists even in the face of actual disagreement.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

In any case where consensus is adopted as the criterion of truth, a single person S, merely by lacking an epistemic peer who disagrees, would be entitled to regard their belief in p as true.

“As Kelly rightly points out, in any case where consensus is adopted as the criterion of truth, it would follow that a single person (S), merely by lacking an epistemic peer who disagrees, would be entitled to regard their belief in p as true.48”

• cites [48]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Any stance that entails philosophical skepticism is intuitively implausible.

“Accordingly, any stance that entails philosophical skepticism is also intuitively implausible.32”

• cites [32] Reining, Stefan. “On The Supposed Dilemma of Conciliationism”. Episteme 13/3 (2016), 305-328. sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Conciliationism lacks a principled analogue to φ3 and cannot distinguish between cases where belief revision is rational and cases where it is not.

“Because conciliationism lacks a principled analogue to φ₃, it cannot distinguish between cases where belief revision is rational and cases where it is not.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

In religious disagreement, peers adopting consensus independent of evidence may fall into epistemic inertia regarding the pursuit of true belief, leading to evidence being entirely abstracted from religious belief.

“In the context of religious disagreement, this poses a significant risk: since the peers adopt a consensus independent of the evidence, they may fall into a kind of epistemic inertia regarding the pursuit of true belief, leading to a situation where evidence is entirely abstracted from religious belief.”