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Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Satterthwaite, Mark Allen·1975·Journal of Economic Theory

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Metadata

Authors
Satterthwaite, M. A.
Venue
Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1975-04
Volume
10
Issue
2
Pages
187-217
ISSN
0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2129678216
Cited by
2,821
References
0
FWCI
84.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
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Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.