The Strategic Use of State Repression and Political Violence
Abstract
Repression is the act of subduing someone by institutional or physical force. Political violence is a particular form of repression involving the use of physical force to achieve political goals. Acts of repression and/or political violence often violate fundamental human rights, and are sometimes referred to as human rights abuse. Most systematic research into these forms of human rights abuse, particularly as perpetrated by governments, is built on assumptions of rationality: repression and political violence are strategic policies that governments employ in pursuit important political and/or military objectives. Since the defining concept of the state is its monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion, those objectives are generally related to quiescence and the quelling of popular dissent. Empirical research has investigated the causes of repression and political violence, focusing generally on the conditions and incentives that make these strategies most likely. To a lesser extent, scholars have also investigated the consequences of human rights abuse. This work is intimately tied to extant work on causes, and highlights an important feedback loop between repressive governments and those who oppose them. Finally, researchers have investigated methods of limiting and/or preventing state repression and political violence. Some of these methods are primarily domestic in nature (e.g., regime type and institutional design) while others have a decidedly international bent (e.g.…
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Weber, M. (2005) · Social Theory · doi:10.1515/9781474469654-020 · Cited by 1,240 · see citing works
Davenport, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111650 · Cited by 623 · see citing works
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
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The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression
Dukalskis, A., Furstenberg, S., Hellmeier, S., & Scales, R. (2024) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231188896 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
“Democracies in general protect civil liberties better than do au-tocracies (Møller and Skaaning 2013) and typically have institutional channels through which dissenting voices can advocate for their causes with less fear of repression (deMeritt 2016).”
Background
- Authors
- deMeritt, J. H. R.
- Affiliations
- University of North Texas (US)
- Corresponding author
- deMeritt, Jacqueline H R
- Venue
- Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York, NY
- Published
- 2016-10-26
- OpenAlex
- W2520894688
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 3
- Type
- reference entry
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Memory, violence, and history
- Keywords
- state repression, political violence, human rights violations, political regimes, institutional design
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