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The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression

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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 47 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The emerging literature dealing with transnational repression has identified several strategies used by authoritarian states to control and coerce their populations abroad. This article builds on existing research by investigating the domestic determinants of transnational repression. It argues that an increase in domestic repression is likely to lead to a subsequent increase in transnational repression because crackdowns at home drive dissent abroad and incentivize the state to extend its repressive gaze beyond its borders. To evaluate its arguments, the article draws on a database of approximately 1200 cases in which authoritarian states around the world threatened, attacked, extradited, abducted, or assassinated their own citizens abroad between 1991 and 2019. Offering a first quantitative test of domestic drivers of transnational repression, using multivariate regression analysis, the paper finds that as repression intensifies domestically, the likelihood of that state subsequently escalating its transnational repression also increases substantively.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Using the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database of 1,205 transnational repression events from 1991–2019, the paper argues and finds that domestic crackdowns in authoritarian states are followed by increased transnational repression. The relationship is strongest when states have diplomatic representation abroad.

Key findings

  • Domestic repression is positively associated with subsequent transnational repression: Model 1 coefficient 1.09* (0.20); with controls, Model 2 coefficient 0.83 (0.26). The predicted probability of transnational repression rises from less than 20% at low domestic repression to more than 50% when domestic repression is widespread.
  • Diplomatic representation moderates the relationship: Model 4’s interaction between domestic repression and diplomatic representation is positive and statistically significant. For states with few diplomatic ties, domestic repression does not increase transnational repression; for states with high diplomatic representation, the probability increases drastically. The state-capacity interaction is not statistically significant (0.01, SE 0.03).
  • Robustness checks show a significant relationship in 13 of 21 V-Dem Civil Liberties Index component indicators, including physical violence (torture, killings), civil society repression, and freedom of foreign movement; there is no effect for forced labor and restrictions on domestic movement.
  • The AAAD records 1,205 events from 1991–2019 involving 35 perpetrating source states. Frequently active source states include Uzbekistan (199), Turkey (163), China (162), North Korea (151), and Russia (74); yearly count highs include Uzbekistan 2005 (61), Syria 2011 (41), and North Korea 2004 (40).

Methods

  • Panel country-year analysis of authoritarian regimes. The main dependent variable is a binary indicator for one or more transnational repression events by a source state in a year; additional models use the yearly count of repression events. The estimation sample is 857 country-year observations from 35 states (1991–2019).
  • Main models use logistic regression with country and year fixed effects and mixed bias-reducing score adjustments; count models use Poisson and negative binomial specifications. Standard errors are clustered by country and year using Newey and West (1986).
  • The independent variable is an inverted V-Dem Civil Liberties Index, lagged by one year. Controls include Polity score, elections, leader tenure, party and military dimension indices, population, GDP per capita, state capacity, and diplomatic representation abroad. Data come from the Authoritarian Actions Abroad Database (AAAD), initially covering 88 authoritarian regimes, though countries without at least one recorded transnational repression event are removed in the fixed-effects estimation.

Limitations

  • The paper states that reliable data on transnational repression are difficult to obtain and verify because such actions are often secretive and deniable, and patterns in which cases come to light may bias results. It also notes that close dyadic relationships between autocratic states may cloak events in “friendly” states, so the analysis may underestimate the relationship between domestic and transnational repression.
  • The paper states that future research should investigate variation by autocratic regime subtype rather than treating democracy and authoritarianism as binary, examine democratic states as sources or host sites of transnational repression, and trace the timing and sequencing of the two proposed pathways.
  • Evident from the text: the fixed-effects estimation drops countries with no recorded transnational repression event, leaving 35 states, so findings may not generalize to all authoritarian regimes. The observational design with lagged variables and fixed effects cannot fully rule out reverse causality or unobserved confounding.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/00220027231188896

Cites

93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Image 1
CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Image 2
CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 1 Perpetrators of Transnational Repression by Number of Cases (1991-2019). No data available for democracies (white). Data source: Dukalskis (2021).
Figure 1 Perpetrators of Transnational Repression by Number of Cases (1991-2019). No data available for democracies (white). Data source: Dukalskis (2021).CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 2 Transnational Repression Events Per Year, 1991-2019. Data source: Dukalskis (2021).
Figure 2 Transnational Repression Events Per Year, 1991-2019. Data source: Dukalskis (2021).CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 3 Methods of Transnational Repression and their Frequency, 1991-2019. Data source: Dukalskis (2021).
Figure 3 Methods of Transnational Repression and their Frequency, 1991-2019. Data source: Dukalskis (2021).CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 4 Bivariate relationship between changes in domestic repression and the probability of one or more subsequent transnational repression event. Dots represent raw data.
Figure 4 Bivariate relationship between changes in domestic repression and the probability of one or more subsequent transnational repression event. Dots represent raw data.CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 5 Predicted Changes in Transnational Repression Given Changes in Domestic Repression (based on Model 2).
Figure 5 Predicted Changes in Transnational Repression Given Changes in Domestic Repression (based on Model 2).CC-BY-NC · From the PDF
Figure 6 Predicted Changes in TR Given Different Levels of State Capacity (left, based on Model 3) and Diplomatic Capacity (right, based on Model 4).
Figure 6 Predicted Changes in TR Given Different Levels of State Capacity (left, based on Model 3) and Diplomatic Capacity (right, based on Model 4).CC-BY-NC · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

5 Valid · 2 Not valid · 29 Not checked · 71 Own results and interpretations

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 93 references

Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. Adamson Fiona, 2019, European Consortium of Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops
  2. Bell Curtis, 2021, The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) Dataset
  3. Bergé Laurent, 2018, 13. DEM Discussion Paper Series
  4. Frantz Erica, 2020, Digital Repression in Autocracies
  5. Freyburg Tina, 2018, International Journal of Communication, 12, 21
  6. Front Line Defenders, 2022, Location
  7. Furstenberg Saipira, 2020, Central Asian Political Exiles Codebook
  8. Giuffrida Angela, 2022, The Guardian
  9. Guriev Sergei, 2022, Spin Dictators
  10. Human Rights Watch, 2014, Human Rights Watch, 28, 2014
  11. Marshall Monty G., 2020, POLITY5. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. Dataset Users’ Manual
  12. Niekerk Brett van, 2011, International Journal of Communication, 5, 1406
  13. Pemstein Daniel, 2022, No. 21. V-Dem Working Paper
  14. Russell Jago, 2018, Turkey’s War on Dissent Goes Global
  15. Schenkkan Nate, 2021, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression
  16. World Bank, 2021, World Bank Open Data
  17. Wrong Michela, 2019, The Guardian
  18. Xinjiang Victims Database, 2019, Xinjiang Victims Database

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dukalskis, A., Furstenberg, S., Hellmeier, S., & Scales, R.
Affiliations
  • University College Dublin (IE)
  • Ca' Foscari University of Venice (IT)
  • University of Konstanz (DE)
Corresponding author
Hellmeier, Sebastian
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2023-07-13
Volume
68
Issue
6
Pages
1051-1079
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W4384153613
Cited by
31
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 1
FWCI
13.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Keywords
transnational repression, authoritarianism, domestic repression, crackdown, extradition, abduction, assassination

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/00220027231188896
The paper
Dukalskis, A., Furstenberg, S., Hellmeier, S., & Scales, R. (2024). The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188896

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