The DOI matches its Crossref record; 91 of the 91 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Abstract
This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on (i) contextualism about knowledge attributions, (ii) modest forms of foundationalism, and (iii) the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
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Citations
Cites
Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science
Feigl, H., & Scriven, M. S. (1956) · Cited by 4,420
American Philosophical Quarterly
(2023) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.60.4.09 · Cited by 3,225
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
Sellars, W. (1997) · University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy (University of Minnesota) · Cited by 2,727
Goldman, A. I., & Nozick, R. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184523 · Cited by 2,039
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Goldman, A. I. (1976) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025679 · Cited by 1,870
Moser, P. K., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1987) · International Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5840/ipq19872729 · Cited by 1,838
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach
Giere, R. N. (1988) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226292038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,766
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Goldman, A. I. (1979) · Justification and Knowledge · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1 · Cited by 1,468
Lewis, D. (1996) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048409612347521 · Cited by 1,450
Cited by
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
Self-citationColor realism and color science
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. R. (2003) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x03000013 · Cited by 517
Enoch, D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9333-6 · Cited by 224
Metadata
- Authors
- Pryor, J.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2001-03-01
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 95-124
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2048122125
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 91
- FWCI
- 132.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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