Cited by 1,450Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy, Science, and History

Elusive Knowledge

Lewis, David·1996·Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/00048409612347521

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

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Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Contextualism in the theory of knowledge embraces the result that knowledge attributions vary with the attributor.

    “Contextualism (see Cohn 1986Cohn , 1988Cohn , 1999;;DeRose 1995;Feldman 1999;Heller 1999;Lewis 1996) in the theory of knowledge is a view that embraces this result.”

    From EPISTEMOLOGY AND INFORMATION (2008) · cites this paper as Lewis 1996

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Authors
Lewis, D.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Lewis, David
Venue
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Published
1996-12
Volume
74
Issue
4
Pages
549-567
ISSN
  • 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-6828
OpenAlex
W4250582129
Cited by
1,450
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 73 · 2025: 97 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 66 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 52 · 2019: 89 · 2018: 60 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 43 · 2014: 42 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 34
FWCI
30.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
Keywords
knowledge, epistemology

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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