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Cited by 223

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, its Evolution, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence

Carruthers, Peter·2002·The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

This paper defends two initial claims. First, it argues that essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem‐solving, on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other—namely, capacities to generate and to reason with suppositions (or imagined possibilities). Second, it argues that the evolutionary function of childhood pretence is to practice and enhance adult forms of creativity. The paper goes on to show how these proposals can provide a smooth and evolutionarily‐plausible explanation of the gap between the first appearance of our species in Southern Africa some 100,000 years ago, and the ‘creative explosion’ of cultural, technological and artistic change which took place within dispersed human populations some 60,000 years later. The intention of the paper is to sketch a proposal which might serve as a guide for future interdisciplinary research. 1 Introduction 2 Creativity and Pretence 3 Language and Creativity 4 Language and Cultural Accretions 5 Language, Play and Model‐Building 6 Creativity, Protean Cognition and Sexual Selection 7 The Evolution of Pretence 8 The Emergence of Supposing 9 Pretence and Motivation 10 Two Objections 11 Conclusion

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Crossref · 10.1093/bjps/53.2.225

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Metadata

Authors
Carruthers, P.
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Published
2002-06-01
Volume
53
Issue
2
Pages
225-249
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
OpenAlex
W2090579575
Cited by
223
References
7
FWCI
472.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, its Evolution, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/bjps/53.2.225
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Carruthers, P. (2002). Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, its Evolution, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/53.2.225

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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