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Cited by 158

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Structure: Its Shadow and Substance

van Fraassen, Bas C. · 2006 · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. 1. Planck against the heretics1.1Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwell's equations 1.2Two responses: reification and structuralism 2. On the road to structuralism2.1The microscope 2.2Mathematization of the world picture 2.3The 18th–20th century 3. The new structural realism3.1From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3How is structural realism supported? 4. An empiricist structuralism4.1Royal succession in science 4.2Defence of the empiricist version 4.3Structure: an empiricist view

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Crossref · 10.1093/bjps/axl002

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Metadata

Authors
van Fraassen, B. C.
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Published
2006-06-01
Volume
57
Issue
2
Pages
275-307
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
OpenAlex
W2128446506
Cited by
158
References
1
FWCI
92.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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