The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Graded Causation and Defaults
Abstract
Recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has shown that judgments of actual causation are often influenced by consideration of defaults, typicality, and normality. A number of philosophers and computer scientists have also suggested that an appeal to such factors can help deal with problems facing existing accounts of actual causation. This article develops a flexible formal framework for incorporating defaults, typicality, and normality into an account of actual causation. The resulting account takes actual causation to be both graded and comparative. We then show how our account would handle a number of standard cases. 1 Introduction2 Causal Models3 The HP Definition of Actual Causation4 The Problem of Isomorphism5 Defaults, Typicality, and Normality6 Extended Causal Models7 Examples 7.1 Omissions 7.2 Knobe effects 7.3 Causes versus background conditions 7.4 Bogus prevention 7.5 Causal chains 7.6 Legal doctrines of intervening causes 7.7 Pre-emption and short circuits8 Conclusion
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Cites
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 3×
“For example, wellknown experiments by Kahneman and Tversky [Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1973] show that we are often poor at explicit statistical reasoning, employing instead a variety of heuristics.”
MethodCAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE
Hitchcock, C. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-110-4-639 · Cited by 4,741
Self-citationReiter, R. (1980) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(80)90014-4 · Cited by 3,892
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5840 · Cited by 3,371
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Magidor, M. (1990) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(90)90101-5 · Cited by 1,660
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Lewis, D. (1979) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215339 · Cited by 1,610
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.015 · Cited by 1,476
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive
Mill, J. S. (2023) · Scientific and Medical Knowledge Production, 1796-1918 · doi:10.4324/9781003009450-5 · Cited by 1,430
Cited by
Normality and actual causal strength
Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F., & Knobe, J. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.010 · Cited by 155
Life and Understanding: The Origins of “Understanding” in Self-Organizing Nervous Systems
Yufik, Y. M., & Friston, K. (2016) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2016.00098 · Cited by 53
Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
Grinfeld, G., Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., Woodward, J. F., & Usher, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 · Cited by 41
Portable Causal Dependence: A Tale of Consilience
Hitchcock, C. (2012) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/667899 · Cited by 32
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Metadata
- Authors
- Halpern, J. Y., & Hitchcock, C.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2015-06-01
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 413-457
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2011861615
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 94.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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