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Are More Details Better? On the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations

Craver, Carl F., Kaplan, David M. · 2020 · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Cited by 225

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Completeness is an important but misunderstood norm of explanation. It has recently been argued that mechanistic accounts of scientific explanation are committed to the thesis that models are complete only if they describe everything about a mechanism and, as a corollary, that incomplete models are always improved by adding more details. If so, mechanistic accounts are at odds with the obvious and important role of abstraction in scientific modelling. We respond to this characterization of the mechanist’s views about abstraction and articulate norms of completeness for mechanistic explanations that have no such unwanted implications. 1 Introduction2 A Balancing Act: When Do Details Matter?3 The Norms of Causal Explanation4 The Norms of Constitutive Explanation5 Salmon-Completeness6 From More Details to More Relevant Details7 Non-explanatory Virtues of Abstraction8 From Explanatory Models to Explanatory Knowledge9 Mechanistic Completeness Reconsidered10 Conclusion

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Metadata

Authors
Craver, C. F., & Kaplan, D. M.
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Published
2020-03-01
Volume
71
Issue
1
Pages
287-319
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
OpenAlex
W2791183485
Cited by
225
References
4
FWCI
87.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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