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Interaction in isolation: 50 years of insights from split-brain research
Abstract
Fifty years ago, one of the first studies that showed the neuropsychological consequences of sectioning the corpus callosum, that great bundle of fibres that connects the two cerebral hemispheres, was published in Brain (Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1967). With the help of several patients who have undergone this procedure and generously given of their time as willing participants in research, a gold mine of information about the way brains function has been ferreted out. Research studies in the ensuing years have both confirmed and extended the findings, not only in the original patient group, but other groups as well. The insights gained from testing these so called ‘split-brain’ patients have contributed to the evolving field of cognitive neuroscience and have helped establish information processing models for how the brain governs behaviour and cognition. The original ‘split-brain’ patients tested in California had undergone a complete transection of the corpus callosum and the anterior and hippocampal commissures (with some minor variance occurring between subjects) to alleviate intractable, severe epilepsy, which it did. Twenty years before, testing of another group of similar split-brain patients in Rochester, New York (cf.Akelaitis, 1941) had not revealed any discernible differences between pre- and post-surgical behaviour, suggesting that not much would be learned from this new group. Using a behavioural testing device (which had not been used in New York) that allowed information to be fed to either hemisphere independent of the other, however, revealed that these patients were to provide a unique opportunity to investigate the separate functions of the two cerebral hemispheres (Fig. 1). Tachistoscope. Presenting visual stimuli with a tachistoscope allows selective presentation of visual information to one hemisphere at a time. Patients were asked to fix their gaze on the centre of the translucent screen, upon which the examiner projects visual stimuli for 0.1 s. Information projected onto the left half of the screen is subsequently processed by the right hemisphere, whereas stimuli presented in the right visual field are processed by the left hemisphere. The short presentation interval prevents visual information on one side of the screen from being processed by both hemispheres due to eye movements. Modified from Gazzaniga (2000), with permission. From the start, the very earliest studies suggested that the separate hemispheres were perceiving, predicting and interacting with the world independently and differently. Although the 1967 paper’s title puts the focus on language processing, its abstract addresses implications far beyond language processing: ‘In general the post-surgical studies indicate a striking functional independence of the gnostic activities of the two hemispheres. Perceptual, cognitive, mnemonic, learned and volitional activities persist in each hemisphere, but can proceed separately in each case outside the realm of awareness of the other hemisphere.’ The goal of this article is to outline some of the challenges in interpreting the experience of interacting with split-brain patients. After briefly summarizing some elementary and uncontroversial findings derived from split-brain patients, we will focus on more controversial points that remain the topic of ongoing debate. In particular, we will review the concept of cross-cueing, which is a crucial and tangible reality when interpreting split-brain results. This may resonate with any reader who has had the experience of working with neurological patients. The starting point for many split-brain experiments is to provide information to one hemisphere at a time (Fig. 1). This is most easily accomplished through the visual system, thanks to its tidy anatomy (Fig. 2). If you stare straight ahead at a spot, information on the right side of space perceived by both eyes will end up in the left hemisphere and information on the left side of space will end up in the right hemisphere. This is true for all of us, including our split-brain patients. Since our hemispheres are connected, it is natural for our brains to stitch the two sides together and create a unified visual world (Gazzaniga et al., 1965). Yet, for the split-brain patient with no such connection, each hemisphere sees only the opposite half of the space. Neuroanatomical basis for processing of visual information. When fixating the centre of the screen (cross), visual information presented on the left half of the screen (blue square) is processed by neurons located in the nasal half of the retina in the left eye and lateral half of the retina in the right eye. While the latter directly project into the right hemisphere, axons of retinal neurons in the nasal half of the left eye (blue) cross from the left to the right hemisphere in the optic chiasm. As a result, visual stimuli presented to the left visual field are processed by the right hemisphere, while stimuli presented to the righ
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“Yet, when asked to draw with the left hand what they see, they will draw what is visible on the left-hand side of the visual field. This is because the left hand is predominantly controlled by the right hemisphere, which only has access to visual information from the left-hand side.”
From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [36]
In the citing paper
“If these subjects are asked to verbally describe what they see, they will report what is visible on the right-hand side of their visual field. This is because language is predominantly controlled by the brain’s left hemisphere, which only has access to visual information from the right-hand side.”
From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [36]
In the citing paper
“Subjects who have had the corpus callosum wholly or partially severed sometimes display disunified behaviour when different stimuli are presented to the two halves of the visual field.”
From Dimensions of Animal Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as [36]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Volz, L. J., & Gazzaniga, M. S.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-06-27
- Volume
- 140
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2051-2060
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W2731905803
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 0.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Brain (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hemispheric Asymmetry in Neuroscience
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Neurology › Neurology and Historical Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Spatial Neglect and Hemispheric Dysfunction
- Keywords
- split-brain, corpus callosum transection, hemispheric lateralization, interhemispheric interaction, language processing, visual field presentation, tachistoscope, epilepsy surgery, interhemispheric transfer, hemispheric dominance, hemispheric integration, hemispheric disconnection
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Functional Laterality, Photic Stimulation, Problem Solving, Visual Perception, Biomedical Research, Split-Brain Procedure
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.