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The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems

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Wright, Timothy F. · 2006 · The Condor

Abstract

The twin concepts of reliability and deception would appear to present an evolutionary paradox for animal communication systems. On one hand, signals should be reliable indicators of a signaler's intentions or quality; otherwise, receivers should ignore these signals and over evolutionary time unreliable signals would disappear. On the other hand, signalers should benefit in many contexts by masking their true intentions or exaggerating their quality, leading to selection for deceptive signals. This paradox has been reflected over the years in major changes in the way signal reliability has been viewed by those studying animal behavior. In the early days of ethology, communication was often considered a cooperative endeavor in which both signalers and receivers benefited from the exchange of information. This viewpoint predicted selection for clear, unambiguous, and reliable signals to maximize the transfer of information between communicants. A major difficulty with this notion is that it relies on selection operating at the group level, a largely discredited concept. In sharp contrast, Dawkins and Krebs (1978) suggested communicative exchanges should be regarded as attempts by a signaler to manipulate the receiver's behavior for its own individual benefit. Under this scenario, deceit would be rife in animal signals and receivers would be under strong selection to discern the true intentions of the signaler. Neglected here was the critical fact that if signals were truly dishonest and essentially uninformative, then selection should favor receivers that ignore them entirely, leading to the eventual collapse of a signaling system. A third way to think about signaling was provided by Zahavi's (1975) handicap concept. The handicap hypothesis is based on two assumptions: 1) that the production of some signals entails a cost that increases with increasing signal intensity, and 2) that this cost is more burdensome to low quality signalers than to high quality signalers. Zahavi (1975) suggested that under these conditions, only high quality individuals would be able to sustain the costs of high intensity signaling, and low quality individuals would signal at lower intensity or not at all. Thus, costly signals can lead to an evolutionary equilibrium in which signal intensity is an accurate measure of signaler quality. Receivers would sustain this equilibrium by attending only to signals that were reliable indicators. Although initial responses to Zahavi's verbal formulation of this idea were lukewarm at best, subsequent mathematical models, especially those of Grafen (1990a, 1990b), gradually convinced many behavioral ecologists that costly signals could work as a mechanism to enforce signal honesty. The critical questions then became just what costs signals might impose, how high these costs might be, and whether these costs compelled absolute reliability or permitted some level of deceptive signaling. The thirty years following Zahavi's initial proposal of the handicap mechanism have seen great growth in theoretical and empirical studies of signal costs, reliability, and deception. The time is ripe for a critical review of these advances, and William Searcy and Stephen Nowicki have obliged with their book The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems. The result is an exceptionally clear and well-organized volume that systematically evaluates the fit of empirical data to theory, highlights areas of disagreement and uncertainty, and provides a road map for future research into animal signaling. This book has many strengths; chief among them is its logical organization. It begins with an introductory chapter reviewing the central problem of signal reliability and explaining relevant theory. To enhance accessibility to the theoretical foundation of this work, the authors utilize graphical versions of the mathematical models that were instrumental in demonstrating that signal costs could impose signal honesty. They introduce the thorny question of just what form these costs might take, a theme that is developed more fully in subsequent chapters that discuss empirical examples of signals. Also introduced briefly are alternatives to the handicap mechanism for maintaining signal reliability; these include an absence of conflict of interest between signalers, mechanistic constraints on signal production, and memory-based individual reputations (here awkwardly termed “individually directed skepticism”). This chapter is the clearest treatment of these topics I have encountered and one I will draw on heavily for my next lectures on the subject. Chapter 2 discusses signaling when signaler and receiver have overlapping interests. A number of models are presented, most of which focus on signaling between two relatives. The first type of signal discussed is chick begging in birds, and evidence is presented showing that parents do respond to chick begging and that begging rates generally

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Metadata

Authors
Wright, T. F.
Venue
The Condor
Published
2006-11-01
Volume
108
Issue
4
Pages
989-991
ISSN
  • 0010-5422 (ISSN-L)
  • 1938-5129
OpenAlex
W4243935424
Cited by
405
References
6
FWCI
8.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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Wright, T. F. (2006). The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems. The Condor. https://doi.org/10.1093/condor/108.4.989

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