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Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
Abstract
It would be reassuring to believe that Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely ordinary blunder. It was a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold war crisis. The results, at Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. Wohlstetter is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind u how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectationsa routine obsessing with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, interservice bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and all for a wider range of contingencies. But, as Wohlstetter shows, the planners who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, interservice bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this book.
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Citations
Cited by
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Fischhoff, B. (1975) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance · doi:10.1037//0096-1523.1.3.288 · Cited by 1,837
Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1971) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(71)90033-x · Cited by 1,819
The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters
Turner, B. A. (1976) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2391850 · Cited by 876
Coping with Uncertainty: A Naturalistic Decision-Making Analysis
Lipshitz, R., & Strauss, O. (1997) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1997.2679 · Cited by 867
Fischhoff, B., & Beyth, R. (1975) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(75)90002-1 · Cited by 685
Metadata
- Venue
- International Affairs
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1966-10
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 695-695
- ISSN
- 0020-5850 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2346
- OpenAlex
- W2095906604
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 26.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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