The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Degree of Skew in Cooperative Societies
Abstract
An optimization model is employed to determine the outcome of within-group conflict in cooperative societies. The model assumes that selection acts simultaneously on the stronger, dominant members of the group to secure more benefits for themselves at the expense of subordinates, and on subordinates to leave the group in response to this usurpation if they can do better elsewhere. When it is in the interest of the dominant to maintain the group, the dominant will be limited in its opportunity to bias the benefits in its favor by the options available to subordinates outside the group. The resulting differences in fitness or net pay-off among group members due to usurpation by dominants define the degree of skew. Ecological factors affect both the net benefit of grouping and the options for leaving, and thus establish the limits of skewing. The assumptions and rules governing this interaction are first outlined using a game theory approach. A continuous model for predicting the exact degree of skew is then developed. This analysis shows that the degree of skew increases when the benefit of group breeding relative to solitary breeding increases, and when the degree of relatedness among group members increases. Finally, the trade-offs between breeding with relatives versus nonrelatives are analyzed from a dominant relative's point of view. The results of two empirical studies on a social bird and a social wasp are compared to the predictions of these models. The exceptionally good fit to the models is interpreted as evidence in favor of the “social manipulation” approach to “helping” and “altruism” in cooperatively breeding species.
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Citations
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Cited by
EVOLUTION OF HELPING BEHAVIOR IN COOPERATIVELY BREEDING BIRDS
Cockburn, A. (1998) · Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.29.1.141 · Cited by 808
A model for the evolution of despotic versus egalitarian societies
Vehrencamp, S. L. (1983) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/s0003-3472(83)80222-x · Cited by 798
Self-citationTHE ECOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR OF BURYING BEETLES
Scott, M. P. (1998) · Annual Review of Entomology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ento.43.1.595 · Cited by 608
Ecology and Evolution of Cooperative Breeding in Birds
(2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511606816 · Cited by 541
Partitioning of reproduction in animal societies
Keller, L., & Reeve, H. K. (1994) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/0169-5347(94)90204-6 · Cited by 500
Metadata
- Authors
- VEHRENCAMP, S. L.
- Venue
- American Zoologist
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-05
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 327-335
- ISSN
- 0003-1569 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2013997412
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 12.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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