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Personal data and personal safety: re-examining the limits of public data in the context of doxing

Open access
Kukul, Batuhan · 2023 · International Data Privacy Law

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 28 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

Doxing is a form of cyber harassment that involves the malicious collection and dissemination of personal information, often resulting in threats of violence, loss of employment, and other negative consequences.

Overview

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TL;DR

The article argues that existing criminal laws in the US, Turkey, UK, Germany, and the EU are inadequate for combating doxing because they often require a course of conduct, explicit threats, or other underinclusive elements. It contends that data privacy law’s purpose limitation principle prohibits using publicly available personal data for doxing, and that future legislation should focus on malicious intent and harm rather than whether data are public or consented to.

Key findings

  • Existing criminal statutes are underinclusive: US § 875(c) reaches only explicit threats to kidnap or injure; the Interstate Stalking Statute requires a “course of conduct” and, despite over three million people reportedly stalked online each year, results in prosecution of only about three; Turkish Articles 123 and 123(A) require persistence or following/contact; UK MCA 1988 requires grossly offensive messages and PHA 1997 requires a course of conduct; German StGB §§ 202(a), 202d, and 238 require hacking, stolen data, or a course of conduct.
  • Hong Kong’s Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021 directly criminalizes doxing without a course-of-conduct requirement, covering specified harms such as harassment, threat, intimidation, bodily harm, psychological harm, and safety concerns, but the paper notes concerns about proving intent to harm and possible suppression of dissent.
  • Data privacy law’s purpose limitation principle prohibits disclosing personal data for malicious purposes even when the data are publicly accessible; the paper cites GDPR Article 9(2)(e), Turkish Data Code Article 5(2)(d), UK ICO guidance, and FTC purpose specification/use limitation, while noting the California Consumer Privacy Act lacks purpose or data minimization limits.
  • Future legislation should target malicious intent and harm, cover a single act or pattern of behaviour, and protect rights beyond privacy, including life, physical integrity, health, safety, and human dignity.

Methods

  • Doctrinal and comparative legal analysis of statutes, cases, and regulatory guidance from Turkey, the US, the EU, the UK, Germany, and Hong Kong.
  • The paper examines definitions and types of doxing, national criminal approaches, and data privacy principles, using illustrative cases such as the Tanya Gresh/Anglin case, Gamergate harassment of Brianna Wu, the Sunil Tripathi misidentification, and swatting incidents.
  • No empirical data collection or statistical analysis is reported; the argument is built from legal texts, court decisions, and secondary scholarly commentary.

Limitations

  • The paper states that Hong Kong’s Ordinance may be difficult to apply because intent to harm must be proven, and it could penalize political criticism or suppress dissent, requiring a balance with freedom of speech.
  • The paper states that existing criminal laws are underinclusive and rarely enforced, and that the GDPR right to be forgotten may not address doxing because it applies only to inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive information and must be balanced against free speech.
  • Evident from the text: the analysis is limited to selected jurisdictions and legal materials, with no empirical testing of enforcement outcomes or victim experiences beyond illustrative cases.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/idpl/ipad011

Cites

5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 51 Own results and interpretations

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Kukul, B.
Affiliations
Bahçeşehir University (TR)
Corresponding author
Kukul, Batuhan
Venue
International Data Privacy Law
Published
2023-06-30
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
182-193
ISSN
  • 2044-3994 (ISSN-L)
  • 2044-4001
OpenAlex
W4382753549
Cited by
9
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3
FWCI
3.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
International Data Privacy Law (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Harassment
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Law › Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
Keywords
doxing, online harassment, cyberbullying, personal data, data privacy law, public data, personal safety, crime, General Data Protection Regulation, neo-Nazism, legal remedies, European Union

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.