Personal data and personal safety: re-examining the limits of public data in the context of doxing
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 28 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Abstract
Doxing is a form of cyber harassment that involves the malicious collection and dissemination of personal information, often resulting in threats of violence, loss of employment, and other negative consequences.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The article argues that existing criminal laws in the US, Turkey, UK, Germany, and the EU are inadequate for combating doxing because they often require a course of conduct, explicit threats, or other underinclusive elements. It contends that data privacy law’s purpose limitation principle prohibits using publicly available personal data for doxing, and that future legislation should focus on malicious intent and harm rather than whether data are public or consented to.
Key findings
- Existing criminal statutes are underinclusive: US § 875(c) reaches only explicit threats to kidnap or injure; the Interstate Stalking Statute requires a “course of conduct” and, despite over three million people reportedly stalked online each year, results in prosecution of only about three; Turkish Articles 123 and 123(A) require persistence or following/contact; UK MCA 1988 requires grossly offensive messages and PHA 1997 requires a course of conduct; German StGB §§ 202(a), 202d, and 238 require hacking, stolen data, or a course of conduct.
- Hong Kong’s Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021 directly criminalizes doxing without a course-of-conduct requirement, covering specified harms such as harassment, threat, intimidation, bodily harm, psychological harm, and safety concerns, but the paper notes concerns about proving intent to harm and possible suppression of dissent.
- Data privacy law’s purpose limitation principle prohibits disclosing personal data for malicious purposes even when the data are publicly accessible; the paper cites GDPR Article 9(2)(e), Turkish Data Code Article 5(2)(d), UK ICO guidance, and FTC purpose specification/use limitation, while noting the California Consumer Privacy Act lacks purpose or data minimization limits.
- Future legislation should target malicious intent and harm, cover a single act or pattern of behaviour, and protect rights beyond privacy, including life, physical integrity, health, safety, and human dignity.
Methods
- Doctrinal and comparative legal analysis of statutes, cases, and regulatory guidance from Turkey, the US, the EU, the UK, Germany, and Hong Kong.
- The paper examines definitions and types of doxing, national criminal approaches, and data privacy principles, using illustrative cases such as the Tanya Gresh/Anglin case, Gamergate harassment of Brianna Wu, the Sunil Tripathi misidentification, and swatting incidents.
- No empirical data collection or statistical analysis is reported; the argument is built from legal texts, court decisions, and secondary scholarly commentary.
Limitations
- The paper states that Hong Kong’s Ordinance may be difficult to apply because intent to harm must be proven, and it could penalize political criticism or suppress dissent, requiring a balance with freedom of speech.
- The paper states that existing criminal laws are underinclusive and rarely enforced, and that the GDPR right to be forgotten may not address doxing because it applies only to inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive information and must be balanced against free speech.
- Evident from the text: the analysis is limited to selected jurisdictions and legal materials, with no empirical testing of enforcement outcomes or victim experiences beyond illustrative cases.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 51 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“To date, there is currently no specific legislation in the USA that prohibits doxing.35”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Communication Decency Act 1996, section 230
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [35]
The reference list we hold has no entry [35].
- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“The Interstate Stalking Statute (ISS) prohibits the use of any interactive computer service in a 'course of conduct' that places a person in a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury or causes substantial emotional distress to a person.46”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Interstate Stalking Statute, section 2261A(2)
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [46]
The reference list we hold has no entry [46].
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“In the case of a serious threat (The True Threat), freedom of expression may be restricted under the circumstances of a substantial case.40”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Communication Decency Act 1996, section 230
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [40]
The reference list we hold has no entry [40].
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“The CDA states that: no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.42”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Communication Decency Act 1996, section 230
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [42]
The reference list we hold has no entry [42].
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Federal prosecutors could use section 875(c) to prosecute actors who dox in combination with administering threats.”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Interstate Communications Statute, section 875(c)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
36 more claims
Create a free account to see all 79 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 27
- It may state two separate claims as one. 20
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Interstate Stalking Statute, section 2261A(2)
“If each actor was only responsible for one or two particular acts, no single person could be held liable because of the 'course of conduct' requirement under section 2261A.49”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > The US Interstate Stalking Statute, section 2261A(2)
“'Course of conduct' is defined as 'a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts.48”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021
“It also requires two elements: first, the disclosure should be made without the data subject's relevant consent, and secondly, the disclosure should cause a specified harm.”
§ the limits of public data in the context of doxing > Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Ordinance 2021
“A person commits an offence if the person discloses any personal data of a data subject without the relevant consent of the data subject (a)with an intent to cause any specified harm to the data subject or any family member of the data subject; or (b)being reckless as to whether any specified harm would be, or would likely be, caused to the data subject or any family member of the data subject.”
Citations
Cites
Douglas, D. M. (2016) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-016-9406-0 · Cited by 191
Online Harassment, Digital Abuse, and Cyberstalking in America
Lenhart, A., Ybarra, M., Zickuhr, K., & Price-Feeney, M. (2016) · doi:10.69985/ippa8074 · Cited by 179
New Technologies, New Problems, New Laws.
Recupero, P. R. (2016) · PubMed · Cited by 24
Doxing as Audience Vigilantism against Hate Speech
Douglas, D. (2020) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0200.10 · Cited by 17
Data Privacy in the Cyber Age: Recommendations for Regulating Doxing and SwattingPreprint
Li, L. B. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3012266 · Cited by 10
Cited by
Confronting the Offensive Stalking Risks: With Standing Cyber Stalkers
Godavarthi, S. M. K., Ganimisetty, S. V., Palanati, S., et al. (2024) · International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication and Applied Informatics (ACCAI) · doi:10.1109/accai61061.2024.10602125 · Cited by 3
“Participating in doxing, a cyberstalking tactic where cybercriminals expose the victim's private information, represents a significant escalation [10].”
BackgroundCyberstalking as a modern threat to public security: countermeasures in Russia and abroad
Larina, E. (2025) · Sociologicheskaja nauka i social naja praktika · doi:10.19181/snsp.2025.13.1.8 · Cited by 2
When Social Media Recruiting Goes Wrong: A Cautionary Tale of Sample Engagement
Lockhart, E. N. S., & Goodin, J. B. (2024) · The Qualitative Report · doi:10.46743/2160-3715/2024.5082 · Cited by 1
Legal Protection for Victims of Cyberstalking According to Indonesia’s Law
Andespitrikasih, L., Waluyo, B., & Harefa, B. (2024) · International Journal of Social Science and Human Research · doi:10.47191/ijsshr/v7-i06-23 · Cited by 2
Beyond Bullying: Digital Platforms, Power and the New Landscape of Violence Against Nurses
Kornhaber, R. A., Cleary, M. L., & Jackson, D. W. (2026) · Issues in Mental Health Nursing · doi:10.1080/01612840.2026.2676205
Metadata
- Authors
- Kukul, B.
- Affiliations
- Bahçeşehir University (TR)
- Corresponding author
- Kukul, Batuhan
- Venue
- International Data Privacy Law
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2023-06-30
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 182-193
- ISSN
- 2044-3994 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-4001
- OpenAlex
- W4382753549
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 3.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- International Data Privacy Law (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Harassment
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Law › Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
- Keywords
- doxing, online harassment, cyberbullying, personal data, data privacy law, public data, personal safety, crime, General Data Protection Regulation, neo-Nazism, legal remedies, European Union
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