The analysis of variance and the analysis of causes
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Abstract
This issue of the American Journal of Human Genetics contains two articles by Newton Morton and his colleagues1,2 that provide a detailed analytic critique of various estimates of heritability and components of variance for human phenotypes. They make especially illuminating remarks on the problems of partitioning variances and covariances among groups such as social classes and races. The most important point of all, at least from the standpoint of the practical, social, and political applications of human population genetics, occurs at the conclusion of the first paper1 in which Morton points out explicitly the chief programmatic fallacy committed by those who argue so strongly for the importance of heritability measures for human traits. The fallacy is that a knowledge of the heritability of some trait in a population provides an index of the efficacy of environmental or clinical intervention in altering the trait either in individuals or in the population as a whole. This fallacy, sometimes propagated even by geneticists, who should know better, arises from the confusion between the technical meaning of heritablility and the everyday meaning of the word. A trait can have a heritability of 1.0 in a population at some time, yet this could be completely altered in the future by a simple environmental change. If this were not the case, ‘inborn errors of metabolism’ would be forever incurable, which is patently untrue. But the misunderstanding about the relationship between heritability and phenotypic plasticity is not simply the result of an ignorance of genetics on the part of psychologists and electronic engineers. It arises from the entire system of analysis of causes through linear models, embodied in the analysis of variance and covariance and in path analysis. It is indeed ironic that while Morton and his colleagues dispute the erroneous programmatic conclusions that are drawn from the analysis of human phenotypic variation, they nevertheless rely heavily for their analytic techniques on the very linear models that are responsible for the confusion. I would like to look rather closely at the problem of the analysis of causes in human genetics and to try to understand how the underlying model of this analysis moulds our view of the real world. I will begin by saying some very obvious and elementary things about causes, but I will come thereby to some very annoying conclusions. We must first separate two quite distinct problems about causation that are discussed by Morton. One is to discriminate which of two alternative and mutually exclusive causes lies at the basis of some observed phenotype. In particular, it is the purpose of segregation analysis to attempt to distinguish those individuals who owe their phenotypic deviation to their homozygosity for rare deleterious gene alleles from those whose phenotypic peculiarity arises from the interaction of environment with genotypes that are drawn from the normal array of segregating genes of minor effect. This is the old problem of distinguishing major gene effects from ‘polygenic’ effects. I do not want to take up here the question of whether such a clear distinction can be made or whether the spectrum of gene effects and gene frequencies is such that we cannot find a clear dividing line between the two cases. The evidence at present is ambiguous, but at least in principle it may be possible to discriminate two etiological groups, and whether such groups exist for any particular human disorder is a matter for empirical research. It is possible, although not necessary, that the form of clinical or environmental intervention required to correct a disorder arising from homozygosity for a single rare recessive allele (the classical ‘inborn error of metabolism’) may be different from that required for the ‘polygenic’ class. Moreover, for the purposes of genetic counselling, the risk of future offspring being affected, will be different if a family is segregating for a rare recessive than if it is not. Thus, the discrimination between two alternative causes of a human disorder is worth making if it can be done. The second problem of causation is quite different. It is the problem of the analysis into separate elements of a number of causes that are interacting to produce a single result. In particular, it is the problem of analyzing into separate components the interaction between environment and genotype in the determination of phenotype. Here, far from trying to discriminate individuals into two distinct and mutually exclusive etiological groups, we recognize that all individuals owe their phenotype to the biochemical activity of their genes in a unique sequence of environments and to developmental events that may occur subsequent to, although dependent upon, the initial action of the genes. The analysis of interacting causes is fundamentally a different concept from the discrimination of alternative causes. The difficulties in the early history of genetics e
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Cites
How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement
Jensen, A. (1969) · Harvard Educational Review · doi:10.17763/haer.39.1.l3u15956627424k7 · Cited by 2,907 · cited 8×
“So, the meaning of the genetic variance is sometimes given as "the amount of variation that would be left if the environment were held constant," and the environmental variance is described as "the amount of variance that would remain if all the genetic variation were removed," an erroneous explanation offered by Jens…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- LEWONTIN, R. C.
- Venue
- International Journal of Epidemiology
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-04-27
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 520-525
- ISSN
- 0300-5771 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3685
- OpenAlex
- W2156368482
- Cited by
- 137
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 3.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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