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Commentary: Gilding the black box

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Kaufman, J. S · 2009 · International Journal of Epidemiology
Cited by 14

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Abstract

Most epidemiology textbooks have the obligatory passage on ‘what is a cause?’ These discussions often start with Hume, pass reverently through Bradford-Hill and (if the book is of relatively recent vintage) end with Pearl. But as Hafeman and Schwartz1 point out in their essay, few texts in our field go on to the question that really motivates these authors, which is ‘what is a causal structure?’ The closest thing I can find on my own bookcase might be Mervyn Susser's2 ‘Causal Thinking in the Health Sciences’, now more than 35 years old and long out of print. Despite the generally simplistic approach taken by our textbooks, the big breakthrough stories in biomedical research often sound like a sportscaster narrating the progress of a pinball machine game: ‘First the ball hits a lever, than bounces into a hole, where it triggers a sensor that opens a chute, and the ball slides down to the flipper …’. The answer to a causal question such as ‘how did I just lose that ball down the side chute?’ can only be answered by referring to (i) multiple events that happened in sequence, (ii) the imagining of alternate ways that the sequence could have occurred instead and (iii) by having the whole process situated in a context with regular and comprehensible laws (such as the physical layout of the pinball machine, or the physiology and environment of a living organism). We naturally tend to conceive of ‘explanations’ as Rube Goldberg devices, where some exposure leads to a predictable cascade of events, and finally to the ‘outcome’—a cancer, or a death, or whatever. And we can easily imagine holding some intermediate gear still, which interrupts the natural flow of this device, and in this way we find that the outcome depended on that step. This is an analysis of mediation. Hafeman and Schwartz make the case that causal structure is ultimately what we really want to know in epidemiology, and I could not agree more. Surely, every one of us would love to stick our fingers into one or another part of the Rube Goldberg machine that generates our favourite health outcome to see what would happen. Sadly, epidemiology is probably the biomedical discipline most thoroughly removed from this sort of satisfying and enlightening exercise. Experimentalists in their laboratories get to do this with everything from Petri dishes to people, manipulating them in endless variations. We epidemiologists, on the other hand, are usually stuck with nothing but observational data. That is, our data are usually gathered by measuring the various configurations of the Rube Goldberg machine as it chugs along, but without being able to intervene in that process in any way. We get to manipulate the resulting data all we want, but that is a whole other ballgame. When we want to know what would have happened under some circumstance that was not observed, we need to use an observed substitute to get that value.3 For example, if we need to know the result for a group exposed to an event at some point in the process, had they instead been unexposed at that point, we might use an appropriately time- and covariate-matched unexposed group. Such substitutions are potentially dangerous because they may be unbalanced across important variables that we do not yet know are part of the causal structure. This is what is known as confounding. While I have no disagreement with Hafeman and Schwartz's stated goal of trying to motivate interest in investigating causal structures, I am not as convinced by their decision to focus exclusively on natural/pure direct and indirect effects, rather than the alternate formulation based on hypothetical actions and known as controlled direct effects.4 There are several practical and conceptual advantages to this latter species of effects,5 and it seems to me both curious and unfortunate that Hafeman and Schwartz should give this interventionist formulation such quick dismissal. First of all, epidemiology is situated within the broader discipline of public health. This may be partly historical accident, but I think it does reflect a real interest in our field on interventions for health improvement. The point of trying to figure out that, say, smoking causes lung cancer is not to merely note this with the passive indifference with which one might observe some distant astronomical event. Rather, I think that most epidemiologists would study such a problem because they would want to know what needs to be done at the population level to lower the incidence of lung cancer. Total causal effect estimates provide for us the anticipated consequences of a manipulation of the exposure variable. But if we want to estimate the effect on the outcome of manipulating the exposure while at the same time fixing some consequence of the exposure to a specific value, this is a controlled direct effect, not a natural/pure direct effect. In the context of an exposure intervention, it is quite straightforward to conceive of a plan that also involves block

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Metadata

Authors
Kaufman, J. S.
Venue
International Journal of Epidemiology
Published
2009-06-01
Volume
38
Issue
3
Pages
845-847
ISSN
  • 0300-5771 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3685
OpenAlex
W2122817910
Cited by
14
References
1
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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