The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution
Abstract
We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. All of these contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive rights to specify and enforce dealers' duties. The allocation of decision rights and incentive intensity differs across brands, however. This variation is explained by the incidence of moral hazard. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is lower, manufacturers hold more rights to determine the performance required from their dealers and to use mechanisms such as monitoring, termination, and monetary incentives to ensure that such performance is provided.
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Citations
Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
The choice of organizational form The case of franchising
Brickley, J. A., & Dark, F. H. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90046-8 · Cited by 1,076
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Cited by
Schepker, D. J., Oh, W.-Y., Martynov, A., & Poppo, L. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313491289 · Cited by 794
Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010 · Cited by 690
On the boundaries between intrafirm and interfirm management accounting research
Dekker, H. C. (2016) · Management Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/j.mar.2016.01.001 · Cited by 95
How Do Franchise Contracts Evolve? A Study of Three German SMEs*
Cochet, O., & Garg, V. K. (2008) · Journal of Small Business Management · doi:10.1111/j.1540-627x.2007.00236.x · Cited by 72
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Arrunada, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-04-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 257-284
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125201552
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 15.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Arrunada, B. (2001). Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/17.1.257
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.