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Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence

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Gil, Ricard, Zanarone, Giorgio · 2017 · Annual Review of Law and Social Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 121 of the 122 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Abstract

In this article, we review the emerging economic literature on formal and informal contracting. Two patterns emerge from this literature. First, the use of informal contracts to complement formal ones is widespread, both within and between firms. Second, informal contracts are limited by the expectation of future collaborations between the parties. Our review suggests that there are significant opportunities for further integrated research in economics, law, and social sciences to enhance our understanding of the interaction between formal and informal contracting within firms, as well as in nonfirm organizations.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413

Cites

121 of 122 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 122 references

Research works printed but not linked: 25

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G.
Affiliations
  • Johns Hopkins University (US)
  • CUNEF Universidad (ES)
Venue
Annual Review of Law and Social Science
Published
2017-10-13
Volume
13
Issue
1
Pages
141-159
ISSN
  • 1550-3585 (ISSN-L)
  • 1550-3631
OpenAlex
W2590517691
Cited by
56
References
119
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 1
FWCI
1.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-sa
Locations
  • Annual Review of Law and Social Science (publishedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • SERVAL (Université de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Social Sciences › Law › Legal principles and applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
formal contracts, informal contracts, contract theory

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413
The paper
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017). Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence. Annual Review of Law and Social Science. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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