The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Courts and Relational Contracts
Open accessAbstract
Post‐communist countries offer new evidence on the relative importance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts. Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positive effect on the level of trust shown in new relationships between firms and their customers. Well‐functioning courts also encourage entrepreneurs to try out new suppliers. Courts are particularly important when specific investments are needed for a relationship to develop. While relationships can sustain existing interactions, workable courts help new interactions to start and develop.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition
Greif, A. (1993) · American Economic Review · Cited by 2,192
Erdem, T., & Keane, M. P. (1996) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.15.1.1 · Cited by 1,221
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
Greif, A., Milgrom, P., & Weingast, B. R. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261953 · Cited by 1,220
The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand
Frye, T., & Shleifer, A. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5856 · Cited by 878
The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market
Ausubel, L. M. (1991) · Cited by 761
Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2444 · Cited by 759
Justice in many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law
Galanter, M. (1981) · The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law · doi:10.1080/07329113.1981.10756257 · Cited by 613
Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System
Kranton, R. E. (1996) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 612
Sobel, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297732 · Cited by 543
Cited by
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.08.005 · Cited by 1,204
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024539 · Cited by 980
Self-citationWhat You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts
Giannetti, M., Burkart, M., & Ellingsen, T. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn096 · Cited by 938
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-04-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 221-277
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122254611
- Cited by
- 533
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 60.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Courts and Relational Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jleo/18.1.221
- The paper
- Johnson, S. (2002). Courts and Relational Contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.221
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
