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Cited by 231

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence

Open access
Bandiera, O.·2003·Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Abstract

Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia developed to protect land from predatory attacks at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common‐agency model, this article shows that (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy protection even if this results in a worse equilibrium for the landowning class and (ii) all things equal, mafia profits are higher where land is more fragmented. The argument is based on the fact that protection involves an externality, in the sense that by buying protection, each landowner deflects thieves on others' properties. Using qualitative data from a parliamentary survey (1881), the article also shows that in 19th century rural Sicily the mafia was in fact more likely to be active in towns where land was more divided.

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Crossref · 10.1093/jleo/19.1.218

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Metadata

Authors
Bandiera, O.
Venue
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Published
2003-04-01
Volume
19
Issue
1
Pages
218-244
ISSN
1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1975294907
Cited by
231
References
1
FWCI
1.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jleo/19.1.218
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Bandiera, O. (2003). Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/19.1.218

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.