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The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling
Abstract
We argue that repeated interaction and high-powered formal contracts can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the relative impact of repeated interaction on incentive problems and contracting costs. In the offshore drilling industry, we find that oil and gas companies are less likely to choose fixed-price contracts as the frequency of their interaction with a driller increases. This supports the conclusion that repeated interaction and high-powered formal contracts are substitutes in this setting, indicating that repeated interaction reduces incentive problems more than contracting costs. In addition, we find that using instrumental variables to account for the endogenous matching of drillers to projects strengthens our results.
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Cites
Specification Tests in Econometrics
Hausman, J. A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913827 · Cited by 18,820
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Cited by
The Two Facets of Collaboration: Cooperation and Coordination in Strategic Alliances
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.691646 · Cited by 768
Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis
Bajari, P., McMillan, R., & Tadelis, S. (2009) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewn002 · Cited by 444
Ryall, M. D., & Sampson, R. C. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.0995 · Cited by 418
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 · Cited by 363
How Contracts Influence Trust and Distrust
Lumineau, F. (2017) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206314556656 · Cited by 310
Metadata
- Authors
- Corts, K. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-04-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 230-260
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2147933055
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 14.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Corts, K. S. (2004). The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/20.1.230
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