The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals"
Abstract
I analyze chief executive officer (CEO) incentives to negotiate shared control in the postmerger governance of the surviving firm. In order to do this, I study abnormal returns in a sample of “mergers of equals” (MOEs) transactions in which the two firms are approximately equal in postmerger board representation. These transactions are friendly mergers generally characterized by premerger negotiations that result in both greater shared control (board and management) and more equal sharing of merger gains between the two firms. On average, the value created measured by combined event returns is no different between MOEs and a matched sample of transactions. However, target shareholders capture less of the gains measured by event returns in transactions with shared governance. Moreover, target shareholders' share of the gains is systematically related to variables representing postmerger control rights, and shared governance is more likely in transactions in which CEOs face greater incentives for control. The evidence suggests that CEOs trade power for premium by negotiating shared control in the merged firm in exchange for lower shareholder premiums.
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Cites
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Event-study methodology under conditions of event-induced variance
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THE ESTIMATION OF CAUSAL EFFECTS FROM OBSERVATIONAL DATA
Winship, C., & Morgan, S. L. (1999) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.659 · Cited by 890
Cited by
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies
Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.002 · Cited by 660
Graebner, M. E., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2004) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/4131440 · Cited by 566
BOONE, A. L., & MULHERIN, J. H. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01225.x · Cited by 534
Metadata
- Authors
- Wulf, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-04-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 60-101
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2084503418
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 33.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Wulf, J. (2004). Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals". Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/20.1.60
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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