The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Scientific Misconduct
Open accessAbstract
This article presents a model of the research and publication process that analyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show, first, that the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave but less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in fraud verification costs may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, a strong “publish or perish” pressure may reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct because it motivates more scrutiny. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence.
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“This is possible due to the research processes information asymmetry22 that can exist on papers when it comes to authorship.”
From Identifying fabricated networks within authorship-for-sale enterprises (2024) · cites this paper as [22]
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Cites
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Replication in Empirical Economics: The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project
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Academic freedom, private‐sector focus, and the process of innovation
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The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement
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Viewpoint: Replication in economics
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“Some experiments have been tried, or are currently in progress, to implement these proposals at some speci(cid:133)c journals (Dewald et al. 1986, Rossner 2006, Nature Immunology 2007, Hamermesh 2007).”
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Cited by
Measuring the Prevalence of Questionable Research Practices With Incentives for Truth Telling
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611430953 · Cited by 2,239
Crowd science: The organization of scientific research in open collaborative projects
Franzoni, C., & Sauermann, H. (2014) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2013.07.005 · Cited by 505
Meta-assessment of bias in science
Fanelli, D., Costas, R., & Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1618569114 · Cited by 364
Blockchain: The Evolutionary Next Step for ICT E-Agriculture
Lin, Y.-P., Petway, J., Anthony, J., Mukhtar, H., Liao, S.-W., Chou, C.-F., & Ho, Y.-F. (2017) · Environments · doi:10.3390/environments4030050 · Cited by 329
Fanelli, D., Costas, R., & Larivière, V. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127556 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- Lacetera, N., & Zirulia, L.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Bocconi University (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Lacetera, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-10-20
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 568-603
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2014333102
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2015: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 3.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Academic integrity and plagiarism
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Academic Publishing and Open Access
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Publishing and Scholarly Communication
- Keywords
- research misconduct, scientific fraud, fraud detection, fraud prevention, information asymmetry, publication process, publish or perish, journal editors, deterrence, star scientists, research incentives
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- Lacetera, N., & Zirulia, L. (2011). The Economics of Scientific Misconduct. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp031
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.