The Economics of Scientific Misconduct
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article presents a model of the research and publication process that analyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show, first, that the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave but less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in fraud verification costs may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, a strong “publish or perish” pressure may reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct because it motivates more scrutiny. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This is possible due to the research processes information asymmetry22 that can exist on papers when it comes to authorship.”
From Identifying fabricated networks within authorship-for-sale enterprises (2024) · cites this paper as [22]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
DYCK, A., MORSE, A., & ZINGALES, L. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x · Cited by 1,858
Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions
Jensen, R., & Thursby, M. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.240 · Cited by 1,159
Martinson, B. C., Anderson, M. S., & de Vries, R. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/435737a · Cited by 1,096
The science and politics of I.Q.
Kamin, L. J. (1974) · PubMed · Cited by 704
Replication in Empirical Economics: The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project
Dewald, W. G., Thursby, J. G., & Anderson, R. G. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 540
Academic freedom, private‐sector focus, and the process of innovation
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Stein, J. C. (2008) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00031.x · Cited by 427
The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement
Garoupa, N. (1997) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00034 · Cited by 405
Viewpoint: Replication in economics
Hamermesh, D. S. (2007) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique · doi:10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00428.x · Cited by 273 · cited 3×
“Some experiments have been tried, or are currently in progress, to implement these proposals at some speci(cid:133)c journals (Dewald et al. 1986, Rossner 2006, Nature Immunology 2007, Hamermesh 2007).”
Research works printed but not linked: 12
- [2] Ashenfelter, O., Haveman, R.H., Riley, J.G. and Taylor, J.T., 1986: Editorial Statement", American Economic Review , 76, 4, v. -
- [13] Evans, S.W.J., 2002: "How Common Is It?", Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh (supplement), 9-12. -
- [15] Fisher, P., 1999: "The End of the Benveniste A/air?", The British Homeopathic Journal , 88, 4. -
- [25] Hearnshaw, L., 1979: Cyril Burt: Psychologist , Cornell University Press -
- 2000, BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF SOIL SCIENCES, 97, 36
- [28] Joynson, R.B., 1989: The Burt A/air , Routledge. -
- [32] LaFollette, M.C., 1992: Stealing Into Print. Fraud, Plagiarism and Misconduct in Scienti c Publishing , University of California Press. -
- [36] Maru i· c, A., 2007: "Small Journals", presentation to the ESF-ORI First World Conference on Research Integrity. -
- [38] National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineers and Institute of Medicine, 1992: Responsible Science , National Academy Press. -
- [42] O¢ ce of Research Integrity, 2005: "Dr. Eric T. Poehlman Press Release", March 17. -
- [50] Sorokina, D., Gehrke, J., Warner, S., and Ginsparg, P.: "Plagiarism Detection in arXiv", Proceedings of the 6th IEEE International Conference on Data Mining , forthcoming. -
- [54] Wible, J., 1998: The Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics Really Mattered , Routledge.
Cited by
Items 101–119 of 119
Karabağ, S. F., & Berggren, C. (2013) · DiVA (Digitala Vetenskapliga Arkivet) · Cited by 3
Detecting Data Error and Inaccuracy: A Case Study of India FDI Inflow
Kasidi, F., Chaturvedi, H., & Singh, R. K. (2010) · Margin The Journal of Applied Economic Research · doi:10.1177/097380101000400402 · Cited by 1
No Organizations for Today’s Einsteins
Agafonow, A., & Pérez, M. (2020) · Handbooks in philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48352-8_69-1 · Cited by 1
The Institutional Pressure to Become a Professor-Entrepreneur
Franzen, S. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-68063-3_5 · Cited by 1
No Organizations for Today’s Einsteins
Agafonow, A., & Pérez, M. (2022) · Handbooks in philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-76606-1_69 · Cited by 1
Scientific publications and the curriculum vitae: A medical student's Achilles' heel?
Sathian, B., Fatima, H., Hussain, S. A., & Menezes, R. G. (2017) · Nepal Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.3126/nje.v7i1.17756 · Cited by 1
Boudreau, K. J. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6025114 · Cited by 1
The Clash Between Scientific Skepticism and Ethics Regulations
Franzen, S. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-68063-3_2
Franses, P. H. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009428033.004
Morocco's Comprehensive Reform in Financial Governance and Regulatory Compliance
Mohammed, E. Y., & Taouab, O. (2024) · Revue Internationale du chercheur · doi:10.5281/zenodo.10828121
Metriche citazionali e mutazioni strategiche della ricerca scientifica: narrative ed evidenzePreprint
Guerra, L. (2023) · E-LIS Repository (University of Naples Federico II)
Entre e além das fronteiras: migração, trabalho e sopros de resistência na Academia Portuguesa
de Oliveira, T. B. (2025) · Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT)
Boudreau, K. J. (2026) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w34811 · Cited by 2
From Practice to Policy: Promise and Constraints of Contemplative Ethics Interventions in Science
Михайловна, Б. П., Hirshberg, M. J., & Goldberg, S. B. (2026) · Mindfulness · doi:10.1007/s12671-026-02867-x
The Evaluated Enforcer: Performance Absorption, Low Enforcement, and Public MonitoringPreprint
Shen, W., Zhang, W., & Guo, Y. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7019858
Research Design as Evidence: Information and Incentives in Peer ReviewPreprint
Chen, W.-C., Chen, W. J., & Sheen, G. C.-H. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7353099
Yu, Y. (2026) · doi:10.2196/preprints.111260 · Cited by 1
Quantifying Undetected Severe Misconduct in Medical ResearchPreprint
Hussinger, K., & Pellens, M. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7690518
Quantifying undetected severe misconduct in medical research
Hussinger, K., & Pellens, M. (2026) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2026.105660
Metadata
- Authors
- Lacetera, N., & Zirulia, L.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Bocconi University (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Lacetera, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-10-20
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 568-603
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2014333102
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2015: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 3.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Academic integrity and plagiarism
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Academic Publishing and Open Access
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Publishing and Scholarly Communication
- Keywords
- research misconduct, scientific fraud, fraud detection, fraud prevention, information asymmetry, publication process, publish or perish, journal editors, deterrence, star scientists, research incentives
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.