The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction
Abstract
We hypothesize that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from extraction by politicians and bureaucrats. In countries where the threat of political extraction is higher, we hypothesize that firms hold a lower fraction of their assets in liquid form. Consistent with this conjecture, using data representing over 30,000 firms across 109 countries, we find that corporate holdings of liquid assets are negatively correlated with measures of political corruption. Further, annual investment in property, plant, equipment, and inventory plus dividends is positively correlated with measures of political corruption suggesting that owners channel their cash into harder to extract assets. To the extent that the threat of political extraction moves firms away from their otherwise optimal levels of liquid assets, our findings suggest that the threat of political extraction may reduce economic development not only through the direct costs of political payoffs but also because the potential for asset extraction moves firms away from their otherwise optimal asset holdings.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, H. P. L. (2000) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.206448 · Cited by 5,754
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms
Miller, M. H., & Orr, D. (1966) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1880728 · Cited by 1,340
The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence
Kim, C.-S., Mauer, D. C., & Sherman, A. E. (1998) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331099 · Cited by 1,244
Cited by
The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.-C., & Saffar, W. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.12.007 · Cited by 790
US political corruption and firm financial policies
Smith, J. D. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.021 · Cited by 398
Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China
Xu, N., Chen, Q., Xu, Y., & Chan, K. C. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.08.007 · Cited by 355
Political institutions, connectedness, and corporate risk-taking
Boubakri, N., Mansi, S. A., & Saffar, W. (2013) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2013.2 · Cited by 349
Duanmu, J.-L. (2014) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/jibs.2014.16 · Cited by 324
Metadata
- Authors
- Caprio, L., Faccio, M., & McConnell, J. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-10-10
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 332-354
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W3121252168
- Cited by
- 207
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 20.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jleo/ewr018
- The paper
- Caprio, L., Faccio, M., & McConnell, J. J. (2013). Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr018
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.