The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations
Open accessAbstract
We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.
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Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749 · see citing works
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Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · see citing works
- Authors
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, H. P. L.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- Corresponding author
- Djankov, Simeon
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 81-112
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121297842
- Cited by
- 5,754
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 146 · 2025: 198 · 2024: 202 · 2023: 219 · 2022: 248 · 2021: 233 · 2020: 268 · 2019: 293 · 2018: 267 · 2017: 269 · 2016: 251 · 2015: 292 · 2014: 323 · 2013: 317 · 2012: 350
- FWCI
- 398.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Asian Industrial and Economic Development
- Keywords
- separation of ownership and control, family business, voting rights, cash flow rights, pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, closely held corporations, firm age
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