Race, Sovereignty, and Free Trade: Arms Trade Regulation and Humanitarian Arms Control in the Age of Empire
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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on norms, arms regulation, humanitarian arms control, and arms control as governmentality by examining the different “Matryoshka dolls” of arms trade governance as they operated in the late nineteenth century. I suggest that analysis of practices in this era has relevance for debates about contemporary arms governance. The innermost doll is represented by a specific regulatory initiative, in this case, the 1890 Brussels Act, which represented an attempt to graft a regulatory arms trade norm onto an established and constitutive anti-slavery norm. The Act was also located within the second matryoshka doll, the broader approach to arms trade prohibition adopted in an era. Despite representations of the period as one of free trade in arms, I highlight extensive efforts to restrict the transfer of firearms to colonial subjects. Finally, I examine the third matryoshka doll, the way in which mechanisms of prohibition and permission constitute the practices of arms control as governmentality—the effort to define and manage which gradations of people can legitimately own, trade, and use which gradations of weapons in what contexts. Overall, the paper challenges the optimistic literature regarding humanitarian arms control and arms trade norms with three concluding implications: the merging of humanitarianism and arms control can reflect both good and bad norms; such a confluence is not necessarily incompatible with colonialism, racism, or imperial violence; and, such a merger is consonant with the maintenance of liberal militarism.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper argues that late-19th-century arms trade regulation was not an era of simple “free trade” in arms, but a dual regime: liberal export freedom from imperial metropoles alongside extensive controls over arms flows in colonial spaces. Using the 1890 Brussels Act, it shows that humanitarian arms control was intertwined with anti-slavery, colonial order, racism, and imperial military advantage rather than being purely progressive.
## Key findings
- The 1890 Brussels Act is presented as the first “Matryoshka doll” of arms trade governance: a discrete prohibitory initiative regulating a specific class of weapons in a specified area of Africa, formally coming into effect on 2 April 1892 after agreement in July 1890.
- The paper states that the Brussels Act was more effective than many accounts suggest: British officials in 1908 considered it “of considerable service in keeping the [arms] traffic within bounds,” though it “completely broken down” in Abyssinia and Somalia.
- It argues that the arms elements of the Brussels Act were partly an attempt to graft a regulatory arms trade norm onto an established anti-slavery norm, but that the campaign was also driven by maintaining qualitative military superiority over colonial subjects.
- The paper contends that late-19th-century arms control in Empire worked through both proscription and permission, and that this was consistent with colonialism, racism, and liberal militarism rather than opposed to them.
## Methods
- The paper uses a historical case study of the 1890 Brussels Act and related imperial arms regulations to develop a genealogy of arms trade regulation.
- It draws on extensive archival research in the UK National Archives at Kew, the British Library, US National Archives in Washington DC and College Park, plus keyword searches in the British Newspaper Archive and The Times online archive, and selected German archival material.
- The analysis is primarily interpretive and genealogical, organizing the argument around three “Matryoshka dolls” of arms trade governance: a discrete humanitarian initiative, broader imperial prohibition, and arms control as governmentality.
## Limitations
- The paper itself says its late-19th-century analysis is meant to support broader debates, but it also acknowledges that contemporary HAC differs from the 19th-century variant; the text does not claim direct equivalence.
- It states that efforts at restraint were “neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete” and that local actors used evasion strategies; this is an inherent limitation in the regulatory regimes discussed.
- The paper is based on a genealogical/historical reconstruction of one historical period and set of cases, so its claims are bounded by the particular archival record and imperial contexts it studies (evident in the text).
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Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 6 Not valid · 46 Not checked · 76 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Second the principles of neutrality were usually interpreted to require states themselves (but not private citizens) to refrain from supplying arms to belligerents (Hyneman 1930; McLaughlin 1938).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hyneman 1930 matched to “Neutrality During the European Wars of 1792–1815: America's Understanding of Her Obligations” (1930) source
- Supportedcites McLaughlin 1938 matched to “Legislative Neutrality in the United States” (1938) source
In Section III ('The Retreat Toward Isolation: United States Neutrality Act of 1937') McLaughlin states expressly that nothing in the international law of neutrality obliged neutrals to prohibit their nationals from exporting munitions or other contraband to belligerents, 'although the neutral was itself obligated to refrain from such traffic,' adding that the practice of most large states countenanced private trade in contraband. That is exactly the state/private-citizen split the citing sentence attributes to it. The NEUTRALITY section's discussion of impartial duties reinforces the same reading of what neutrality required of the state. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In contrast to representations of the period as one of free trade in arms I demonstrate the extensive efforts to restrict the transfer of firearms to colonial subjects.”
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I suggest the Act represented an attempt to graft a regulatory arms trade norm onto an established anti-slavery norm and that it was more extensively implemented than has been recognised.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Even in the Western Pacific, colonial powers sought to curtail the supply of arms to colonial subjects.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The British in West Africa introduced legislation to implement the Brussels Act in the Gold Coast and Ashanti as well as Sierra Leone. 15”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
77 more claims
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Citations
Cites
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081898550789 · Cited by 8,292
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(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-5942 · Cited by 2,135
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Research works printed but not linked: 17
- Bade, 1977, Antisklavereibewegung in Deutschland Und Kolonialkrieg in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1888—1890: Bismarck Und Friedrich Fabri, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3, 31
- Borrie, 2006, Small Arms and the Geneva Forum: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action, 137
- Bothe, 1993, The Arms Trade: Comparative Aspects of Law, Revue Belge De Droit International, 24
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003, Putting People First: Human Security Perspectives on Small Arms Availability and Misuse
- Finlay, 2016, Commerce and Christianity: Scottish Presbyterians, Slavery and Islam, 1870–1900, 175
- Finnemore, 1996, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, 153
- Gray, 1910, VI West Africa, Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, 10, 382
- Hertslett, 1967, The Map of Africa by Treaty: A Reprint of the Third Edition in Three Volumes and a Collection of Maps
- Krause, 2017, The Consequences and Legacies of Interwar Arms Trade Control Negotiations, 155
- Mackay, 1890, The Solution of the African Problem, The Church Missionary Intelligencer and Record: A Monthly Journal of Missionary Information, Vol. 15, 40
- Rhodes, 1890, The Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference, The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, 907
- Schneer, 2001, London 1900: The Imperial Metropole
- Stoker, 2003, Girding for Battle: The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815
- United Nations Institutions for Disarmament, 2017, Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Nuts and Bolts of the Ban. The New Treaty: Taking Stock
- Wizotski, 2013, Humanitarian Arms Control: The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 82
- Wunderlich, 2013, Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics
- Yakemtchouk, 1977, Les Antecedents De La Reglementation Internationale Du Commerce D'armes En Afrique, Revue Beige de Droit International, 13, 144
Cited by
Controlling weapons circulation in a postcolonial militarised world
Stavrianakis, A. (2018) · Review of International Studies · doi:10.1017/s0260210518000190 · Cited by 41
The Arms Trade and the Transformation of Global Order: A Revitalized Research Agenda
Stavrianakis, A. (2025) · Global Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isagsq/ksaf033 · Cited by 24
Peacebuilding’s Origins and History
Pugh, M. C. (2020) · Rethinking peace and conflict studies · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-56477-3_2 · Cited by 7
Bromley, M. (2023) · Defence Studies · doi:10.1080/14702436.2023.2277455 · Cited by 4
“Some attempts have been made to apply this expanded concept of norms to the field of export controls (see Cooper 2018).”
BackgroundRacial Capitalism Must Be Defended: Reading the Arms Trade through Critiques of Policing
Rossdale, C. (2025) · Global Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isagsq/ksaf032 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, N.
- Affiliations
- University of Bradford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Cooper, Neil
- Venue
- Journal of Global Security Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-08-20
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 444-462
- ISSN
- 2057-3170 (ISSN-L)
- 2057-3189
- OpenAlex
- W2785959061
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 132
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 1.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model (vor)
- Locations
- Journal of Global Security Studies (publishedVersion)
- Bradford Scholars (University of Bradford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Global Peace and Security Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Law and Human Rights
- Keywords
- arms trade regulation, governmentality, colonialism, racism, imperialism, late 19th century
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