Accountable Agents: Federal Performance Measurement and Third-Party Government
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Abstract
Ordinarily research articles on public sector third-party governance, or the state of agents, turn to the subject of accountability in their conclusions. Rather than leaving it to the conclusions, this article takes up the subject of public sector third-party governance as a problem of accountability. To consider accountability, we studied contemporary performance measurement practices in the federal government, particularly as they are applied in five agencies of the US Department of Health and Human Services. Our findings are presented using a six-part “promises of accountability” heuristic which captured the many and varied uses of accountability in contemporary policy and administration discourse. We found that the characteristics of third parties and the nature of their principal-agent relations are a key determinant of accountability; bureaucratic and hierarchical controls enhance agency and program accountability; building rules and program policies into grants and contracts enhance accountability; agencies that practice lateral trust-based forms of “relational contracting” foster cultures of accountability; auditing and reporting requirements enhance program accountability; federal performance measurement regimes tend to be “top down” and “one size fits all;” federal performance measurement regimes are primarily executive branch forms of accountability; performance measurement often represents attempts to superimpose managerial logic and managerial process on inherently political processes embedded in the separation of powers; there is little evidence that performance-based accountability results in enhancing democratic outcomes or greater justice or equity.
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Citations
Cited by
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12238 · Cited by 1,547
Co-Production and Co-Creation: Engaging Citizens in Public Services
Brandsen, T., Steen, T., & Verschuere, B. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315204956 · Cited by 450
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
“Accountability forums sometimes appear to be quite uninter-ested in the accountability information requested at an earlier stage (Brandsma 2010; Dubnick and Frederickson 2010).”
InfluentialA Preliminary Theory of Informal Accountability among Network Organizational Actors
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., & Blackmar, J. M. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02547.x · Cited by 256
Accountability and corporate governance of public private partnerships
Shaoul, J., Stafford, A., & Stapleton, P. (2012) · Critical Perspectives on Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2011.12.006 · Cited by 241
Metadata
- Authors
- Dubnick, M. J., & Frederickson, H. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-12-17
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- Supplement 1
- Pages
- i143-i159
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W1978934215
- Cited by
- 101
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dubnick, M. J., & Frederickson, H. G. (2010). Accountable Agents: Federal Performance Measurement and Third-Party Government. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup039
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