Cited by 335Public Policy and Administration ResearchSocial Policy and Reform StudiesFood Security and Health in Diverse Populations

Administrative Exclusion: Organizations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming

Brodkin, E. Z., Majmundar, M.·2010·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Abstract

Organizations operate as the gateway to public benefits. They are formally authorized to adjudicate claims, in the process interpreting and applying eligibility rules. Beyond their designated role, they also operate as informal gatekeepers, developing modes of operation that affect the ease or difficulty of claiming. Operational practices—both formally prescribed and informally created—can add hidden costs to claiming to the extent that they are complicated, confusing, or cumbersome. Individuals implicitly recognize these costs when they complain of being “tied up in red tape” or given the “bureaucratic run around.” This inquiry examines whether these types of hidden organizational costs can have systematic effects, resulting in administrative exclusion—that is, nonparticipation attributable to organizational factors rather than claimant preferences or eligibility status.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/jopart/mup046

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Beneficiaries living in deep poverty and with lower education are more likely than others to lose TANF benefits because of failures to overcome compliance costs.

    “In a study of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) find that beneficiaries living in deep poverty and with lower education are more likely than others to lose benefits because of failures to overcome compliance costs.”

    From Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen‐State Interactions (2020) · cites this paper as Brodkin and Majmundar (2010)

    The Findings section reports that TANF claimants in deep poverty and high school dropouts were more likely to leave for procedural rather than nonprocedural reasons. But the paper does not establish that they lost benefits because they failed to overcome compliance costs: the 'Organizational Practices and Inequality' section notes that procedural leavers may also have chosen to exit or become ineligible. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 42

  1. Adler, M. 2006. Fairness in context. Journal of Law and Society 33:615-38.
  2. Bane, Mary Jo, and David T. Ellwood. 1994. Welfare realities: From rhetoric to reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
  3. Bennett, Susan. 1995. ''No relief but upon the terms of coming into the house''-Controlled spaces, invisible disentitlements, and homelessness in an urban shelter system. Yale Law Journal 104: 2157-212.
  4. Bers, Alice. 2001. Reforming welfare after welfare reform. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 36:571-606.
  5. Blank, Rebecca M., and Patricia Ruggles. 1996. When do women use AFDC and Food Stamps? The dynamics of eligibility versus participation. Journal of Human Resources 31:57-89.
  6. Blasi, Gary M. 1987-88. Litigation strategies for addressing bureaucratic disentitlement. Review of Law and Social Change 16:591-603.
  7. Brodkin, Evelyn Z. 1986. The false promise of administrative reform: Implementing quality control in welfare. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press.
  8. ---. 1997. Inside the welfare contract: Discretion and accountability in state welfare administration. Social Service Review 71:1-33.
  9. ---. 2006. Bureaucracy redux: Management reformism and the welfare state. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17:1-17.
  10. ---. 1989. Quality control in public assistance: Victimizing the poor through one-sided accountability. Clearinghouse Review 22:1381-89.
  11. Cherlin, Andrew J., Karen Bogen, James M. Quane, and Linda Burton. 2002. Operating within the rules: Welfare recipients' experiences with sanctions and case closings. Social Service Review 76: 387-405.
  12. Currie, Janet. 2004. The takeup of social benefits. NBER Discussion Paper #1103. Available at SSRN .com/abstract5527143.
  13. Charles Dickens meets Franz Kafka: The maladministration of New York City's public assistance programs. New York University Review of Law and Social Change 17:231-54.
  14. Diller, Matthew. 2000. The revolution in welfare administration: Rules, discretion, and entrepreneurial government. New York University Law Review 75:1121-220.
  15. Etheridge, Marcus E., and Stephen L. Percy. 1993. A new kind of public policy encounters disappointing results: Implementing Learnfare in Wisconsin. Public Administration Review 53:340-47.
  16. Felstiner, William E F., Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat. 1980-81. The emergence and transformation of disputes: Naming, blaming, claiming. Law and Society Review 15:631-54.
  17. Grogger, Jeffrey. 2005. Markov forecasting methods for welfare caseloads. NBER Working Paper No. 11682. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  18. Grogger, Jeffrey, and Lynn A. Karoly. 2005. Welfare reform: Effects of a decade of change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
  19. Grogger, Jeffrey, Steven J. Haider, and Jacob Klerman. 2003. Why did the welfare rolls fall during the 1990s? The importance of entry. American Economic Review 93:288-92.
  20. Keiser, Lael R., Peter R. Mueser, and Seung-Whan Choi. 2004. Race, bureaucratic discretion, and the implementation of welfare reform. American Journal of Political Science 48:314-27.
  21. Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. Politics: Who gets what, when, how. New York: McGraw Hill.
  22. Lens, Vicki, and Susan E. Vorsanger. 2005. Complaining after claiming: Fair hearings after welfare reform. Social Service Review 79:430-53.
  23. London, Rebecca A. 1996. The difference between divorced and never-married mothers' participation in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. Journal of Family Issues 17: 170-85.
  24. Lurie, Irene. 2006. At the front lines of the welfare system: A perspective on the decline in welfare caseloads. Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute Press.
  25. Mashaw, Jerry L. 1974. The management side of due process: Some theoretical and litigation notes on the assurance of accuracy, fairness and timeliness in the adjudication of social welfare claims. Cornell Law Review 59:772-824.
  26. Maynard-Moody, Steven, and Michael Musheno. 2003. Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
  27. McLanahan, Sara, and Gary Sandefur. 1994. Growing up with a single parent: What hurts, what helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
  28. Mead, Lawrence M. 1986. Beyond entitlement: The social obligations of citizenship. New York: Free Press.
  29. Meyers, Marcia K., Bonnie Glaser, and Karin MacDonald. 1998. On the front lines of welfare delivery: Are workers implementing reforms? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17:1-22.
  30. Moffitt, Robert. 2003. The role of nonfinancial factors in exit and entry in the TANF program. The Journal of Human Resources 38:1121-254.
  31. Nathan, Richard P. 1983. The administrative presidency. New York: Wiley.
  32. Pandey, Sanjay K., and Patrick G. Scott. 2002. Red tape: A review and assessment of concepts and Measures. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12:553-80.
  33. Riccucci, Norma M., Marcia K. Meyers, Irene Lurie, and Jun S. Han. 2004. The implementation of welfare reform policy: The role of public managers in front line practices. Public Administration Review 64:438-48.
  34. Ridzi, Frank, and Andrew S. London. 2006. It's great when people don't even have their welfare cases opened: TANF diversion as process and lesson. Review of Policy Research 23:725-43.
  35. Sandfort, Jodi R. 2000. Moving beyond discretion and outcomes: Examining public management from the front lines of the welfare system. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10:729-56.
  36. Simon, William H. 1983. Legality, bureaucracy, and class in the welfare system. Yale Law Journal 92:1198-269.
  37. Soss, Joe. 2000. Unwanted claims: The politics of participation in the U.S. welfare system. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
  38. Soss, Joe, Sanford F. Schram, Thomas P. Vartanian, and Erin O'Brien. 2001. Setting the terms of relief: Explaining state policy choices in the devolution revolution. American Journal of Political Science 45:378-95.
  39. Super, David A. 2004. Offering an invisible hand: The rise of the personal choice model for rationing public benefits. Yale Law Journal 113:815-93.
  40. ---. 2003a. Review of sanction policies and research studies. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation.
  41. Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2009. Race, Poverty, and Policy Implementation: Inside the Black Box of Racially Representative Bureaucracies. Paper presented at Symposium on Welfare States in Transition, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, May 15, 2009.
  42. Wilson, William J. 1987. The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Brodkin, E. Z., & Majmundar, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (US)
Corresponding author
Brodkin, E. Z.
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Published
2010-01-15
Volume
20
Issue
4
Pages
827-848
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
OpenAlex
W2155683593
Cited by
335
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 38 · 2023: 59 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 7
FWCI
21.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › General Health Professions › Food Security and Health in Diverse Populations
Keywords
welfare recipients, public benefit, bureaucratic complexity, eligibility rules, claim adjudication, non-participation, bureaucratic red tape

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review