The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement
Abstract
The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement argues that defiance sometimes is a virtue even for those with mental illnesses. It also argues that defiance is sometimes mistaken as a sign of mental disorder when it may have other, reasonable explanations. This book offers a nuanced and complex look at defiance, taking seriously issues of mental disorders while also attending to social contexts in which defiant behavior may arise. Arguments are presented for how to understand defiance as different from noncompliance, resistance, and other related concepts, and how defiance is related to living a life with a realistic understanding of a flourishing life and its limits in our everyday world. A framework for differentiating different forms of defiance is offered, and a realistic picture of phronesis—practical reasoning—is presented that makes room for clinicians as well as patients to assess the degree to which defiance is reasonable. The concept of intersectionality as it relates to child development is worked through to highlight some of the challenges clinicians face when interpreting defiant behavior. Particular attention is given to issues of race and gender as factors that need to be considered when evaluating defiant behavior as reasonable, virtuous, bad, or symptomatic. Practical applications for psychiatric engagement are threaded throughout this book through case studies and personal narratives. The virtue of giving uptake is introduced to assist psychiatrists in be…
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Aristotelian conceptions of flourishing have tended to exclude members of marginalized groups who may need to develop specific virtues such as defiance or anger to resist their unjust situation, leading to pathologisation of virtues made necessary by social context.
“On the one hand, Aristotleian conceptions of flourishing have tended to exclude members of marginalized groups who may need to develop specific virtues such as defiance or anger in order to resist their unjust situation, leading to the pathologisation of the very virtues made necessary by the social context (Potter, 2016;Tessman, 2005).”
From Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life (2022) · cites this paper as Potter, 2016
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Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life
Chapman, R., & Carel, H. (2022) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12456 · Cited by 231 · see citing works
- Authors
- Nyquist Potter, N.
- Venue
- Oxford Medicine Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-09
- OpenAlex
- W4232312988
- Cited by
- 32
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 1.74
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychology and Mental Health
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- defiance, mental illness, virtue ethics, practical wisdom, practical reasoning, non-compliance, resistance, eudaimonia, intersectionality, child development, race, gender, clinical ethics, psychiatric diagnosis
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