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Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites
Abstract
I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, phenomenal indiscriminability is transitive. For if it were not transitive, we would be precluded from accepting the truisms that if two things look the same then the way they look is the same and that if two things look the same then if one looks red, so does the other. Nevertheless, it has seemed obvious to many philosophers (e.g. Goodman, Armstrong and Dummett) that phenomenal indiscriminability is not transitive; and, moreover, that this non‐transitivity is straightforwardly revealed to us in experience. I show this thought to be wrong. All inferences from the character of our experience to the non‐transitivity of indiscriminability involve either a misunderstanding of continuity, a mistaken interpretation of the idea that we have limited powers of discrimination, or tendentious claims about what our experience is really like; or such inferences are based on inadequately supported premisses, which though individually plausible are jointly implausible.
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Cites
On the coherence of vague predicates
Wright, C. (1975) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485049 · Cited by 367
Cited by
Martin, M. G. F. (2004) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000033751.66949.97 · Cited by 544
Broome, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/019924376x.001.0001 · Cited by 511
Shapiro, S. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280391.001.0001 · Cited by 374
Metadata
- Authors
- Graff, D.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-10-01
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 440
- Pages
- 905-936
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2039497362
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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